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GRAND BARGAINS FOR BIG DATA: THE EMERGING LAW OF 
HEALTH INFORMATION 
FRANK PASQUALE* 
ABSTRACT 
Health information technology can save lives, cut costs, and expand ac-
cess to care.  But its full promise will only be realized if policymakers broker a 
“grand bargain” between providers, patients, and administrative agencies.  In 
exchange for subsidizing systems designed to protect intellectual property and 
secure personally identifiable information, health regulators should have full 
access to key data those systems collect. 
Successful data-mining programs at the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services (“CMS”) provide one model.  By requiring standardized collection 
of billing data and hiring private contractors to analyze it, CMS pioneered in-
novative techniques for punishing fraud.  Now it must move beyond deterring 
illegal conduct and move toward data-driven promotion of best practices. 
With this aim in mind, CMS is already subsidizing technology, but more 
than money is needed to optimize the collection, analysis, and use of data.  Pol-
icymakers need to navigate intellectual property and privacy rights skillfully.  
They must condition current (and future) government support for providers 
and insurers on better collection and dissemination of health information.  If 
they succeed, the law of health information might better incorporate public val-
ues than information law generally. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Quantitative analysis of large information sets (“big data”) has 
spurred scientific and business breakthroughs.1  Better collection and 
analysis of health data may save lives, cut costs, and expand access to 
care.  Congress has allocated billions of dollars for health information 
technology since 2009,2 but more than subsidies are needed to assure 
optimal collection, analysis, and use of data in medicine. Policymakers 
need to skillfully navigate areas of law often used to stop the sharing 
of data, including intellectual property rights and contractual obliga-
tions. 
By siloing data, health insurers and providers have impeded the 
types of large-scale analysis common in other industries.  Providers 
have kept vital information about price, quality, and access secret to 
maintain a competitive advantage or hide shortcomings.3 For exam-
ple, insurers keep secret many of the prices they pay.4  Each major 
drug company’s “data exclusivity”5 may mean that rivals waste vast 
amounts of money pursuing leads that have already proven to be dead 
ends.  Health information technology systems may not be interopera-
ble, leaving them unable to “talk to one another” and share data.6 
Though the inherent inefficiencies of intellectual property (“IP”) 
law may be acceptable in ordinary markets, they raise serious ques-
tions in the life-and-death domain of health care.7  Federal and state 
authorities are pushing back against aggressive deployment of IP pro-
tections by health care providers and insurers.  Sometimes the 
pushback involves reporting requirements attached to subsidies;8 in 
                                                        
 1.  See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at A1 (surveying 
“revolution[s] in measurement” made possible by an “explosion of data”).  “Big data” is 
shorthand for advancing technological trends that allow for the collection, analysis, and 
use of an ever-increasing flood of data.  Id. 
 2.  See infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5.  See infra Part II.A. 
 6.  See infra Part II.D; see also David Blumenthal, Implementation of the Federal Health In-
formation Technology Initiative, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2426, 2428 (2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsr1112158 (describing how the technical 
requirements in the HITECH Act “are vital to ensuring that [electronic health records] 
can communicate with one another (or interoperate)”). 
 7.  See infra notes 268–272 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 113–117. 
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other cases, IP law itself is simply declared inapplicable or directly lim-
ited in the medical context.9  Federal and state agencies are imposing 
a new bargain on insurers and providers: In exchange for persistent 
subsidies and government support, they must reveal key data about 
their activities.10  Sometimes, as in the case of health information 
technology’s “meaningful use” regulations,11 the activities themselves 
must change to reflect public values.  Federal and state agencies need 
to require providers and insurers to reveal key data in exchange for 
government support, while minimizing the possibility of improper us-
es of that data. The proper balance between privacy and innovation, 
or openness and propertization, will depend on the end goal of par-
ticular government data initiatives.  Sometimes the aim will be the 
creation of new—or repair of old—markets for data.  In other in-
stances, the goal will be an information commons. The challenge is to 
rationalize complex, often conflicting legal frameworks as the stakes 
rise.  Increasing computer power means that both uses and misuses of 
data are becoming more important. 
The increasing power of data to be used for both good and ill 
arises from powerful trends within industry and computing science.  
Increasingly, complete digital copies of health providers’ business 
practices exist in cloud-based storage services.12  Purchases, expenses, 
business strategies, and other documents coexist in ever-cheaper and 
more easily copied files.  Individuals are also taking advantage of the 
new technology.  For example, members of the “Quantified Self” 
movement could insert verified tracking of average pulse, sleep time, 
weight, and meters walked per day, based on smartphone-enabled 
self-monitoring.13  An era of “big data” promises exhilarating and 
frightening opportunities to cure and exploit human vulnerabilities.14 
                                                        
 9.  See infra notes 279, 311 (discussing Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) access 
to aggregate data while allowing data partners to retain control over proprietary, patient 
level data). 
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 113–121. 
 11.  See infra text accompanying notes 113–121 (discussing meaningful use).  Other 
scholars have defined “meaningful use” of electronic health records (“EHRs”) as “the level 
of use that providers would have to attain to qualify for incentive payments under the 
HITECH Act.”  Blumenthal, supra note 6, at 2426. 
 12.  Cloud computing transfers “application software and server-based databases to 
centralized, large data centers.”  Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providers and Data 
Security Law, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 230–31 (2011). 
 13.  Anita Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 47, 52 (2008) (“The lifelog could easily store data pertaining to purely biological 
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Legal scholars have responded by analyzing how current law will 
govern data flows.15  These existing rules include limits on disclosure 
posed by the proprietary interests of corporations.16  Recent develop-
ments suggest that these legal regimes, primarily concerned with the 
restriction of information flows, may impede innovation and under-
mine public health.17  They may also provide illusory assurances: In 
case of an emergency or breach, even the best-protected data flows 
will likely be subject to multiple forms of collection, analysis, and 
use.18  Is there a way to take advantage of rapidly increasing capacities 
to store and analyze data while protecting proprietary information? 
Software-based automation has raised living standards dramati-
cally in the developed world.  It makes factories more efficient, ren-
ders vast amounts of information accessible, and improves the quality 
                                                        
states derived from continuous self-monitoring of, for example, heart rate, respiration, 
blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal.”); Emily Singer, The Measured Life, MIT TECH. 
REV., July/Aug. 2011, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/ 
424390/the-measured-life/ (“The new generation of devices rely on inexpensive, low-
power wireless transceivers that can automatically send data to the wearer’s cell phone or 
computer.  Compared with the limited snapshot of health that is captured during an an-
nual visit to the doctor’s office, these tools and techniques could reveal the measures of 
someone’s health in context, and with a much richer resolution.”). 
 14.  See Randal E. Bryant, Randy H. Katz, & Edward D. Lazowska, Big-Data Computing: 
Creating Revolutionary Breakthroughs in Commerce, Science, and Society (Dec. 22, 2008), 
http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Big_Data.pdf (arguing that big-data computing can 
and will transform the way many sectors of our society operate). 
 15.  See infra note 271–272. 
 16.  See infra Parts II.A., II.D. 
 17.  See Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Licensing for Scientific Innovation, 
INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y Winter 2009, at 12, available at http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp_ 
web-doc_1-13-2009.pdf (noting that copyright laws create a block for generating new scien-
tific research and discoveries).  
 18.  See, e.g., Sara A. Needles, The Data Game, 88 N.C. L. REV. 267, 296–97 (explaining 
that HIPAA “permits broad exceptions in health care providers’ privacy policies to allow 
disclosure pertaining to the protection of public health, essential government functions, 
law enforcement purposes, and as authorized by programs such as workers’ compensa-
tion”).  Similar exceptions also limit state laws that offer stronger privacy protections than 
HIPAA.  See Jason Sterzer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A 50-State Survey Exploring Federal 
and State Firearm Regulations Related to Mental Health, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 171, 196 (2012) 
(“[S]tate privacy laws . . . have exceptions for disclosure of personal health information to 
specified individuals/entities without consent pursuant to mandatory reporting require-
ments, specifically to law enforcement.”). 
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of daily life in barely noticeable ways.  To realize these types of ad-
vances in health care, government needs to catalyze better data col-
lection, retention, and analysis in the industry.19  Government itself is 
scarcely a model here; the information technology systems of many 
government agencies are years behind even the sclerotic computing 
capacities of struggling hospitals.20  Nevertheless, agencies like CMS 
have a proven track record of contracting technically savvy private en-
tities to interpret data to detect and deter fraud.21  Such public-private 
surveillance partnerships should have a much larger role in health 
care. 
Unfortunately, trade secrecy and some other IP protections now 
prevent the realization of the full scale of efficiencies possible in an 
era of big data.22  The cost of excess IP protection is a persistent 
theme in IP scholarship.23  Scholars seek to reshape doctrine so that it 
respects the unique economic conditions (and moral imperatives) re-
lated to specific industries. 
One way to do so is to insist on the autonomy of a subject matter-
defined legal field (versus the trans-substantive aspirations of, say, 
contract, tort, or property law).  Private law scholars assailed that au-
tonomy by warning about the distortionary effects of applying differ-
ent laws to different sectors,24 and health law professors have shared 
                                                        
 19.  See infra Part III.D. 
 20.  Sometimes the lag can be counted in decades.  See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Open-
ing Speech at the SEC Open Meeting—Consolidated Audit Trail (May 26, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch052610mls-audit.htm (“The technology 
for collecting data and surveilling our markets is often as much as two decades behind the 
technology currently used by those we regulate.”).  For a theoretical perspective on the 
challenges to governance raised by information lag, see generally WILLIAM SCHEUERMAN, 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004). 
 21.  See infra notes 408–409 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 99, 274–275. 
 23.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN & KAL RAUSTIALA, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 
(2012)  (calling for more measured IP protections); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE 4 (2008) (acknowledging that the American patent system is broken).  
For a more radical perspective, see Peter Frase, Four Futures, JACOBIN (Winter 2012), 
http://jacobinmag.com/winter-2012/four-futures/ (“The embryonic form of class power 
in a post-scarcity economy can be found in our systems of intellectual property law.”). 
 24.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 208 (1996).  The phrase “law of the horse” is meant to embody the idea “that the best 
way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules.”  Id. at 
207.  This critique is summed up well by a rhetorical question Easterbrook posed in his 
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such concerns 25  But those anxieties ought to fade as a distinct field 
of health care economics develops and lawyers interpret the massive 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act (“HITECH”) and Patient Protection and Affordability Care Act 
(“PPACA”) legislation passed in 2009 and 2010.26  The field is suffi-
ciently unique that it demands not only distinctive treatment in the 
common law, but also sufficient latitude in the statute-driven world of 
intellectual property, data protection, and cyberlaw to reflect the im-
portance of new health information flows. 
The law of health information is neither more “open” nor more 
“closed” than information law generally.  Free access should be dic-
tated in areas of extreme personal or societal need; in other cases, it 
may be right to force high payments—either ex ante via taxes, or ex 
post via high prices—from those with the ability to pay.  Privacy 
should play a far more important role here than it does in the usual 
Wild West of Internet data collection and processing.  But once data 
is truly anonymized, the research imperative for access is perhaps 
more pressing here than in any other area of law (except, perhaps, 
national security).  Health professionals and patients believe the med-
ical field deserves some autonomy from the normal laws of IP. 
The stage is now set for a distinctive law of “health information” 
to emerge, as government uses its leverage in the sector to tamp down 
proprietary strategies that undermine the public weal.  Over a decade 
ago, Bill Sage complained that both supporters and critics of infor-
mation-based regulation in health care “have overlooked serious op-
erational issues and misunderstood some of the best uses of infor-
mation.”27  Sage argued that disclosure must be “properly designed 
                                                        
article: “If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-understood technology such as 
photocopiers—if we have not even managed to create well-defined property rights so that 
people can adapt their own conduct to maximize total wealth—what chance do we have 
for a technology such as computers that is mutating faster than the virus in The Andromeda 
Strain?”  Id. at 210. 
 25.  See Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 625 
(2008) (“No one has expressed the perceived incoherence of health law more compre-
hensively than many of the nation’s leading health law scholars themselves . . . .”). 
 26.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 6301, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(e) (2010)); Title VIII 
(“HITECH”) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226–79 (2009) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 27.  William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1710 (1999). 
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and implemented” in order to improve outcomes, and he worried 
that the disclosure movement of the 1990s was ill-equipped to provide 
actionable information to patients and providers.28  This Article will 
document computational and legislative advances that should assuage 
many of Sage’s concerns, if policymakers at key government agencies 
can properly implement laws like HITECH and PPACA. 
The argument will proceed as follows.  Part II will present failures 
in the current health information order, ranging from suppressed da-
ta about drug safety to hidden prices of procedures.  Part III will lay 
out the types of efficiencies that could be attained in each area if 
health care shared the productivity gains characteristic of mature in-
formation industries.  Part IV will explain how existing public-private 
surveillance partnerships should inform regulatory developments 
here.  Part V will conclude by situating the argument in a larger con-
text, explaining the normative concerns that need to be balanced in 
the emerging law of health information. 
II.  INFORMATION GAPS IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
Classic economic theory directly relates the competitiveness of a 
market to the amount of information available about the products 
and services exchanged in it.29  Health care, however, is one of many 
areas where intermediaries consider information gathering either a 
commodifiable service in itself, or an aspect of their own competitive 
strategy.  There is an important divide between researchers who have 
access to critical medical research and those who do not.30  While the 
market value of intermediaries who ration access to data may have 
been clear in an era of laborious paper gathering and transcribing, it 
                                                        
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970) (discussing economic models involving “trust” 
and uncertain quality); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 947, 965–66 (1963) (discussing behaviors influenced by in-
formation inequality in a medical context). 
 30.  See JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO 
RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 5 (2005) (describing challenges to individuals and institu-
tions); see generally OPEN ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND MEDICAL INFORMATION 
(Anthi Katsirikou ed., 2011) (describing numerous articles that discuss varying strategies 
to address the issue). 
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must be questioned in today’s market, where computing capacity 
makes data capture an almost trivially easy proposition.31 
Experts suggest that as much as a third of health care spending 
in the United States may be wasted on inappropriate, useless, or even 
harmful care.32  This massive misallocation of resources may be at-
tributed, in part, to failures to act on current data, but it also occurs 
because useful data is not available, does not exist, or is actively hid-
den.33  The emerging field of agnotology studies such lacunae by ex-
amining the “structural production of ignorance, its diverse causes 
and conformations, whether brought about by neglect, forgetfulness, 
myopia, extinction, secrecy, or suppression.”34  The following Sections 
explore the problem of missing data in health care from an agnoto-
logical perspective, focusing on strategies for hiding or destroying 
knowledge. 
A.  Suppressed Data 
There is a remarkable amount of undisclosed health data about 
the effects of pharmaceuticals.35  Companies push to keep exclusive 
access to their own data, even when serious concerns arise about their 
products.  As Ernest House observed, companies have repeatedly de-
nied permission for the reporting of negative information.36  A lead-
                                                        
 31.  See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 14 (2009) (describing declining costs of data capture and storage, and the 
“the technical developments—digitization, cheap storage, easy retrieval, and global ac-
cess—that have altered the economics of remembering and facilitated the demise of for-
getting”). 
 32.  See SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US 
SICKER AND POORER 5 (2007) (stating that “a third of the medicine we receive is unneces-
sary”); MAGGIE MAHAR, MONEY-DRIVEN MEDICINE 78 (2006) (lamenting the “laissez-faire 
chaos of the marketplace” in health care). 
 33.  See infra Parts II.A, II.D. 
 34.  Robert N. Proctor, Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of 
Ignorance (and Its Study), in AGNOTOLOGY: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF IGNORANCE 3 
(Robert N. Proctor & Londa N. Schiebinger eds., 2008).   
 35.  See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 
297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 308, 308–10 (2007) (reviewing undisclosed medical information re-
lated to Vioxx, Baycol, Redux, Paxil, Rezulin, Propulsid, Bextra, and Zyprexa). 
 36.  See Ernest R. House, Blowback: The Consequences of Evaluation for Evaluation, 29 AM. 
J. EVAL. 416, 418 (2008) (“One review of 122 articles in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association found that 65% of harmful effects were not completely reported . . . .  Authors 
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ing firm has been accused of suppressing negative data about Cele-
brex,37 Zoloft, and Cymbalta.38  The Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) has long protected the secrecy of key data.39  These are only a 
few examples of disturbing patterns in misleading data collection, 
presentation, and analysis by the industry.40 
                                                        
cherry-picked results.  Researchers are subject to binding contracts that allow companies 
to determine what can be revealed from the study . . . .” (citation omitted)).  The FDA has 
not adequately responded to these suspect practices.  See, e.g., James M. Wood & Roxanne 
M. Gariby, Hoarding Away Science: Towards a More Transparent View of Health and Online Regis-
tries for Independent Postmarket Drug Research, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 547, 547–50 (2005) (crit-
icizing data secrecy at the FDA); Editorial, Next Stop, Don’t Block the Doors: Opening Up Access 
to Clinical Trials Results, 5 PLOS MED. 1007, 1007 (2008) (supporting FDA requirements to 
make results from clinical trials publically available on the Internet). 
 37.  See Arthur Schafer, Biomedical Conflicts of Interest: A Defence of the Sequestration Thesis: 
Learning from the Cases of Nancy Olivieri and David Healy, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 8, 18–19 (2004), 
available at http://jme.bmj.com/content/30/1/8.full (describing how drug manufacturer 
Pharmacia withheld six months of data regarding Celebrex testing results). 
 38.  See DAVID HEALY, THE ANTI-DEPRESSANT ERA 24 (1997) (concluding that “the dis-
covery of antidepressants has been the invention of and marketing of depression”); Jeanne 
Lenzer, What the FDA Isn’t Telling, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2005, 6:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2005/09/drug_secrets.html (detailing 
how the FDA refused to provide information about duloxetine after a college student, who 
was acting as a test subject in a clinical trial of the drug, committed suicide). 
 39.  See Howard Mann, Hidden Data at the FDA, BIOETHICS F. (June 15, 2006), available 
at www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=184 (criticizing FDA’s long-
standing policy of declining to disclose results of drug trials).  According to the Critical 
Path Institute, outdated methods of assessing drug safety may also be discouraging innova-
tion.  See Predictive Safety Testing Consortium, CRITICAL PATH INST., http://www.c-
path.org/pstc.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (“The tests used to determine drug safety 
have not changed in decades.  Although companies have developed newer safety testing 
methods, these are not generally accepted by FDA or EMA as proof of safety.  This is due, 
in part, because the methods used for testing are often different from company to compa-
ny.  That discrepancy leaves regulatory scientists uncertain about which methods should be 
preferred. Another key factor is that the tests have not, in the past, been independently 
validated.  PSTC now . . . serves as a neutral third party to assess drug safety tests.”).   
 40.  See BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND 
HARM PATIENTS 15 (2013) (“[U]nflattering trial data can simply be withheld from doctors 
and patients . . . .”); Donald W. Light, Bearing the Risks of Prescription Drugs, in THE RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 15–17 (Donald W. Light ed., 2010) (describing “five institutional 
practices” that lead to what Light refers to as the “risk proliferation syndrome”).  Efthmios 
Parasidis has summarized Light’s findings.  See Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Ad-
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The medical community is becoming increasingly skeptical about 
the amount and value of information provided by pharmaceutical 
firms.  According to one commentator, “[s]elective publication and 
reporting in studies sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry exag-
gerate the efficacy of some medications while minimizing their side 
effects.”41  Overseas trials can give firms maximum discretion to pick 
                                                        
dressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products, 5 WIS. L. REV. 929, 975–76 
(2011).  The author lists industry tactics including: 
1. Excluding patients with profiles that are judged to be more likely to suffer 
adverse health events;  
2. Structuring clinical trials with short durations so latent effects are less likely 
to be uncovered;  
3. Limiting the number of participants in clinical trials so as to reduce the like-
lihood of uncovering all adverse health effects;  
4. Recording only selective side effects;  
5. Excluding patients who removed themselves from clinical trials because they 
could not tolerate the side effects;  
6. Selectively publishing study results to disproportionally favor positive re-
search findings;  
7. Removing patients who have strong placebo responses;  
8.  Testing some patients before the trial officially begins and selecting only 
those patients who have an initially positive response to the product under 
evaluation;  
9. Secretly un-blinding interim results midway through a clinical trial and al-
tering the trial design prior to re-blinding the study;  
10. Conducting trials in countries where quality and ethical oversight is lack-
ing;  
11. Utilization of ingredients from sources where FDA oversight is minimal or 
precluded;  
12. Ghost writing scientific articles;  
13. Ghost managing academic research;  
14. Off-label promotion absent evidence of safety and efficacy 
Id.  Goldacre has promoted the website AllTrials.net to require creation of new (and en-
forcement of extant) rules to assure that “[a]ll trials past and present . . . be registered, 
and the full methods and the results reported.”  ALLTRIALS.NET, http://www.alltrials.net/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
 41.  Gilbert Melander et al., Evidence B(i)ased Medicine, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1171, 1173 
(2003); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS 
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 114 (2012) (“[C]onflicts of interest persist because the firm 
that seeks to market a drug designs and controls the clinical trials used to test its safety and 
efficacy.”). 
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and choose which trial data to report.42  This “non-system” not only 
endangers the clinical subjects exploited by unscrupulous contract re-
searchers, but also leads to misuse of “rescue countries”—areas with 
researchers who are reputed to be most likely to come back with posi-
tive results.43 
An integral part of the value of a drug is knowledge about how 
well (and for whom) it works.44  An information environment selec-
tively curated by those with the most to gain from sales of drugs does 
not assure the drugs’ proper use.45  If researchers are connected to 
the company whose drug is evaluated, the findings are four times 
more likely to be favorable to the product than when researchers have 
no connections.46 
Even as the United States suffers serious drug shortages and 
counterfeiting problems, problematic manufacturing processes are 
also emerging.47  Many commentators have blamed the FDA for fail-
                                                        
 42.  See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Deadly Medicine, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2011, 
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/01/deadly-medicine-201101 
(“[M]ost clinical trials are conducted overseas—on sick Russians, homeless Poles, and 
slum-dwelling Chinese—in places where regulation is virtually nonexistent, the F.D.A. 
doesn’t reach, and ‘mistakes’ can end up in pauper’s graves . . . .”). 
 43.  See id. (“There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be espe-
cially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called ‘rescue coun-
tries.’”). 
 44.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007) (describing the importance of gathering data 
about drugs’ efficacy and side effects). 
 45.  See House, supra note 36, at 418  (noting that, in a study of 370 randomized drug 
trials, “studies recommended the experimental drug as the ‘treatment of choice’ in 51% of 
trials sponsored by for-profit organizations compared to 16% sponsored by nonprofits”).  
 46.  See Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 
2004, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/the-truth-
about-the-drug-companies/?pagination=false (advocating reforms to end “the inappropri-
ate control drug companies have over the evaluation of their own products”). 
 47.  See Kevin Born, Time and Money: An Analysis of the Legislative Efforts to Address the Pre-
scription Drug Shortage Crisis in America, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 235, 241 (2012) (“As drug manu-
facturing becomes more global with 40% of drugs being made outside of the United States 
and 80% of domestically manufactured drugs containing an active pharmaceutical ingre-
dient (API) from a foreign supplier, the drug supply becomes more susceptible to any dis-
ruption in the supply chain or production process, even in remote parts of the world.”); 
Securing the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, La-
bor and Pensions, 112th Cong. 5–11 (2011) (statement of Deborah M. Autor, Esq., Deputy 
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ing to adequately monitor plants, and congressional proposals would 
empower the agency to require drug manufacturers to report on pre-
dicted supply disruptions.48  Congress, however, has added dozens of 
duties to the FDA’s docket without commensurately increasing staff-
ing or funding.49  Moreover, many manufacturing processes are mov-
ing overseas.50  The end result is complex supply chains that are hard 
to monitor even within firms, let alone outside them.51  Data integrity 
problems are brewing for many companies.52 
                                                        
Comm’r for Global Regulatory Operations and Policy, Food and Drug Administration), 
available at http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=3fe78bef-5056-9502-5da8-
cf290af9c334 (discussing access and audit capabilities of other nations). 
 48.  Born, supra note 47, at 242–45. 
 49.  See Parasidis, supra note 40, at 931–32 (“[G]ross underfunding restricts the ability 
of regulators to monitor and enforce post-market obligations. . . .  [T]he FDA epitomizes 
‘the hollow government syndrome—an agency with expanded responsibilities, stagnant 
resources, and the consequent inability to implement or enforce its statutory man-
dates.’”(citation omitted)); Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 348 (“Congress has repeatedly fi-
ne-tuned the FDA’s mandate . . . .”).  
 50.  See BARRY LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND COMING FALL OF THE GLOBAL 
CORPORATION 15–17 (2005) (describing the complexity and fragility of many supply 
chains); Elizabeth Dwoskin, Your Food Has Been Touched by Multitudes, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/your-food-has-
been-touched-by-multitudes-08252011.html (“Congress put off perhaps the most useful 
tool for quickly heading off outbreaks [of food poisoning]: A rule requiring food compa-
nies to keep records about where their ingredients come from was left out of the final 
bill.”). 
 51.  See Jaime Moss, Patients at Risk: The Need to Amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 
Ensure the Safety of Imported Prescription Drugs, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 297, 307–09 (describ-
ing the need for regulators to know more “details regarding the country of origin of the 
raw materials or other aspects of” supply chains); Frank Pasquale, Audit Trails: The Corpo-
rate Surveillance We Need, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 28, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://balkin.blogspot. 
com/2011/08/audit-trails-corporate-surveillance-we.html (“Purposeful avoidance of track-
ing may well indicate a corporate plan to destroy evidence of wrongdoing.”). 
 52.  See Moss, supra note 51, at 308–11 (describing several disturbing cases); MARCIA 
ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 3–9 (2004) (describing how pharmaceutical companies manipulate science 
and politics to make more money); Jim Edwards, FDA Has Only 2 Inspectors Watching Drug 
Factories in China, CBS MONEY WATCH (Dec. 4, 2009, 3:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
8301-505123_162-42843667/fda-has-only-2-inspectors-watching-drug-factories-in-china/ 
(“[T]he fact that the FDA has just two people to cover [China,] a territory 3.7 million 
square miles in size[,] raises questions about how often those factories and labs will be in-
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Even within reported clinical trials, irregularities or biased results 
can be engineered.  For example, choosing a placebo as a comparator 
can make a drug look far more useful than it actually is.53  Those or-
ganizing the trial may choose subjects designed to minimize side ef-
fects, or fail to report the full effects of the drug.54  For instance, 
“Merck did not count subjects who dropped out of the treatment 
group because Vioxx was making them ill if these people didn’t have 
heart attacks or strokes within fourteen days of dropping out, even if 
they had coronary events soon after.”55  Selective publication can also 
distort or hide a drug’s true effects.56  Finally, there is evidence that 
postmarketing surveillance has been inadequate.57  The Food and 
                                                        
spected to make sure the drugs they are producing are safe for Western—or indeed any—
patients.”). 
 53.  See MAHAR, supra note 32, at 78 (“[D]rug-makers tend to avoid head-to-head clini-
cal trials, preferring to test their newest nostrums against placebos rather than comparing 
them to existing, often less expensive treatments.”).   
 54.  See Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better 
Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 964–65 (2007) (“Long-term clinical tests provide the 
best evidence about the safety risks of drugs . . . [but] ‘clinical trials are designed primarily 
with efficacy,’ not safety outcomes in mind.”); Barbara Martinez et al., Expiration Date: 
Merck Pulls Vioxx from Market After Link to Heart Problems, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2004, at A1 
(describing Merck & Co.’s failure to conduct trials to study potential heart-safety issues 
with the drug Vioxx, despite knowledge that an alarming number of patients taking the 
drug suffered heart attacks or strokes).   
 55.  House, supra note 36, at 417; see also Cathy O’Neil, How Big Pharma Cooks Data: The 
Case of Vioxx and Heart Disease, NAKED CAPITALISM (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.naked 
capitalism.com/2012/02/25244.html (concluding that “the clinical trials for drugs should 
not be run or reported on by the drug companies themselves [and t]here has to be a third 
party which is in charge of testing the drugs”). 
 56.  See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 76 (2008) (describing “selective reporting 
of favored results”); Frank Pasquale, Human Farming & the Limits of Medical Research, 
HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/12/ 
16/human-farming-the-limits-of-medical-research/16, 2010 (describing a “litany of poorly 
controlled or ramshackle studies” and other reasons for doubting medical research).   
 57.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-090-866, NEW DRUG APPROVAL: FDA 
NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS OVERSIGHT OF DRUGS APPROVED ON THE BASIS OF SURROGATE 
ENDPOINTS (2009) (“Concerns have been raised about FDA’s . . . oversight of postmarket-
ing studies”); Jordan Paradise, Reassessing Safety for Nanotechnology Combination Products: 
What Do Biosimilars Add to Regulatory Challenges for the FDA, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 465, 483 
(2012) (“[P]roblems with industry adherence to post-market requirements linger.”). 
 2013] GRAND BARGAINS FOR BIG DATA 695 
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 was intended to ad-
vance transparency in drug research, but remains inadequately im-
plemented.58 
Many other western countries have tried to address these agency 
problems by establishing authoritative centers to gather information, 
such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence in Britain.59  Re-
cent developments in the United States follow these steps in small 
ways,60 but congressional interventions have also deterred many ef-
forts to impose similar discipline.61 
                                                        
 58.  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 
505(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETICS ACT (2011), http://www.fda.gov 
/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM17200
1.pdf.  The Act includes provisions FDCA § 505(k)/21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (regarding records 
of clinical experience); FDCA § 505(o)/21 U.S.C. § 355(o) (regarding postmarket studies 
and clinical trials); FDCA § 505-1/21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (regarding risk evaluation and mitiga-
tion strategies); FDCA § 505(5)/21 USC § 355(r) (regarding postmarket drug safety in-
formation for patients and providers, including a website for drug safety information).  
Nevertheless, critics contend that much more needs to be done to assure public and medi-
cal community understanding of the implications (and limits) of disclosed information. 
Deborah A. Zarin & Tony Tse, Moving Toward Transparency of Clinical Trials, 319 SCI. 1340, 
1342 (2008). 
 59.  See Nicholas Timmins, Letter from Britain: Across the Pond, Giant New Waves of Health 
Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2138, 2140–41 (2010) (describing the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which is at the cutting edge of an evidence-based move-
ment aimed at reducing health care costs and getting value for money).  But see MICHAEL 
SCHLANDER, GALEN INSTITUTE, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAMS: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE: DISCUSSING GERMANY AND THE UK 11-16 (2009) (offering more critical per-
spectives).   
 60.  The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) has long studied ef-
fectiveness. See AHRQ’s Career Development and Postdoctoral Training Awards for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq. 
gov/fund/training/cdpostcer10.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).  It received some funding 
for comparative research via the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderni-
zation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2438–41 (2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 299b-7(e) (2006)).  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) author-
ized the establishment of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (“PCORI”), 
which will complete important research on effectiveness.  See Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 727 (2010); see also Chris 
Fleming, New Health Affairs Issue: Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG 
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Problems like the ones mentioned above have provoked the 
Cochrane Collaboration, a widely respected advocacy group, to de-
mand free access to all data from clinical trials.62  Their work, as well 
as that of Victoria Stodden and the open science movement generally, 
is a worthy extension of an access-to-knowledge movement that is well-
known for its opposition to patent and copyright maximalism.63  The 
question now is whether government will use the power of the purse 
to force more openness.  Failing that, it can at least use the advanced 
data analysis suggested in Part III to create an information environ-
ment less polluted by bias than the present one. 
                                                        
(Oct. 5, 2010, 7:36 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/10/05/new-health-affairs-
issue-comparative-effectiveness-research (“A national push on comparative effectiveness 
research is underway as a result of federal stimulus and health reform legislation.”).  But see 
Peter J. Neumann and Milton C. Weinstein, Legislating Against Use of Cost Effectiveness Infor-
mation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1495 (2010) (discussing ACA restrictions on the PCORI’s 
use of QALYs). 
 61.  See Steven D. Pearson & Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative Effec-
tiveness Research in Deciding on New Coverage and Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1796, 1796–
97, 1802–03 (2010) (endorsing modest steps toward value-based purchasing, and describ-
ing legal barriers to it). 
 62.  See The Cochrane Collaboration Supports Free Access to All Data from All Clinical Trials, 
Cochrane Policies, COCHRANE COLLABORATION (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.cochrane. 
org/about-us/our-policies/support-free-access-to-all-data-from-all-clinical-trials (“Selective 
reporting of trial results occurs frequently, leading to exaggerated findings of the benefi-
cial effects of healthcare interventions and underestimates of their harms.  As a conse-
quence, many patients are unknowingly treated with interventions that have little or no 
effect, and may be harmed unnecessarily.  This is unethical and has been said to violate 
the implicit contract between healthcare researchers and patients, where the aim of re-
search is to improve treatment of future patients.”); Gary Price, Cochrane Collaboration Urges 
Free Access to All Data from All Clinical Trials: End to Selective Reporting Can Reduce the Risk of 
Harm to Patients, LIBR. J. INFODOCKET (Oct. 5, 2011), http://infodocket.com/2011/10/05 
/cochrane-collaboration-urges-free-access-to-all-data-from-all-clinical-trials-end-to-selective-
reporting-can-reduce-the-risk-of-harm-to-patients/ (explaining how and why Cochrane 
Collaboration has petitioned for mandatory free access to all data from all clinic trials). 
 63.  See Stodden, supra note 17, at 2 (“[P]revailing scientific norms . . . provide both 
that results be replicated before accepted as knowledge, and that scientific understanding 
be built upon previous discoveries for which authorship recognition is given.”). 
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B.  Misleading Quality Indicators 
Internet-savvy patients aim to find high quality doctors in a world 
of uneven care.64  Insurers also aim to direct resources to reliable pro-
viders.65  As Ellen Nakashima has reported, “data-driven surveillance 
offers the prospect of using incentives to steer patients to care that is 
both effective and sensibly priced.”66  The data can have important re-
sults.  According to one survey, “users who picked a top-performing 
hospital or surgeon from the latest available report had approximately 
half the chance of dying as did those who picked a hospital or sur-
geon from the bottom quartile.”67 
But the quality of Internet reviews of doctors has been ques-
tioned.68  Moreover, more formal rating systems can have perverse 
consequences, encouraging doctors to shun the sickest patients.  For 
example, a cardiac surgeon may turn away very ill patients in order to 
keep the mortality rate associated with his practice low.69  At least one 
journalist has contended that gaming of ratings was common in New 
York after the state “ma[d]e public the mortality rates of its heart sur-
geons.”70  In the few years after this public reporting standard was 
adopted, the Cleveland Clinic “received 31 percent more referrals 
from New York hospitals than they had previously received,” and 
these referrals were “sicker than those who were referred from other 
                                                        
 64.  See infra note 66. 
 65.  See infra note 66. 
 66.  Ellen Nakashima, Doctors Rated but Can’t Get a Second Opinion, WASH. POST, July 25, 
2007, at A1. 
 67.  Ashish K. Jha & Arnold M. Epstein, The Predictive Accuracy of the New York State Coro-
nary Artery Bypass Surgery Report-Card System, 25 HEALTH AFF. 844, 844 (2006). 
 68.  See Ron Lieber, The Web Is Awash in Reviews, but Not for Doctors.  Here’s Why, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at B1 (discussing patients’ “unquestioning mind-set that may cause 
such low participation (or disproportionately positive reviews) at many review sites”).   
 69.  See, e.g., Robert Kolker, Heartless, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 16, 2005, available at 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/health/features/14788/ (“An anonymous 1999 survey of 
bypass surgeons revealed that 62 percent of cardiac surgeons refused to treat at least one 
patient in the preceding year who was perceived to be high risk.”).  For related problems, 
see Rachel M. Werner & David A. Asch, The Unintended Consequences of Publicly Reporting 
Quality Information, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1239, 1239 (2005). 
 70.  Id.; see also Frank Pasquale, “Best Doctors:” Shaming Shirkers or Shunning the Sickest?, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 28, 2007), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/ 
2007/07/doctor_ratings.html (providing specific examples of “gaming” that took place in 
New York). 
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states.”71  The statistics suggested a consistent effort to game the sys-
tem by focusing care on the patients most likely to enjoy positive out-
comes.72 
Risk adjustments can solve simple gaming; for example, mortality 
figures can be adjusted to reflect the sickness of patients or the com-
plexity of a procedure.73  But risk adjustments themselves can be 
gamed.74  Doctors might even add unnecessary procedures during a 
routine surgery to avoid reputational damage once the patient takes 
an unexpected turn for the worse.75 
                                                        
 71.  Pasquale, supra note 70 (“In the first few years after the report-card program be-
gan, the Cleveland Clinic received 31 percent more referrals from New York hospitals than 
they had previously received—and the study verified that the New York patients were sick-
er than those who were referred from other states . . . .  David Dranove of Northwestern 
released a study in 2003 suggesting that the patients being selected for surgery in New 
York were simply healthier than elsewhere.”).   
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 215, 229 (2009) (“[I]n an ideal world, report card measures would focus 
on clinical outcomes. Patients care about outcome measures such as lower mortality rates, 
not whether physicians are board-certified or the frequency of beta blocker prescriptions 
in hospital settings.  These alternative measures are imperfect at best, and are used mainly 
because it can be costly and difficult to measure outcomes and to risk-adjust them proper-
ly, so that they reflect the providers’ quality, rather than underlying patient characteristics.  
In practice, very few report cards measure outcomes, and the outcomes they capture tend 
to be a limited subset of what patients may care about.”). 
 74.  For more on the problem of manipulation of ratings in health care, see Nic Terry, 
Fear of Facebook: Private Ordering of Social Media Risks Incurred by Health Care Providers, 90 NEB. 
L. REV. 703, 746-47 (2012) (discussing “sockpuppetry” and “astroturfing.”).   
 75.  See Kolker, supra note 69.  The author states: 
David Brown of SUNY–Stony Brook remembers a patient from 1999, a man in 
his early fifties who was athletic, a bicyclist, whom he referred to surgery for a by-
pass.  On paper, the man was a low-risk patient—young, healthy, with just one 
vessel that needed repair.  For some reason, however, the man went into cardiac 
arrest while being put under anesthesia.  If he had died, the Department of 
Health would have scored the death with a very high mortality and no risk ad-
justment.  But the man survived, and a week later Brown glanced at the report 
and noticed that the surgeon had performed an additional procedure while the 
patient was on the table.  ‘He did a mitral annuloplasty, which is putting a little 
ring around the mitral valve,’ Brown says.  Because of this surgery, this patient no 
longer could be considered for the state data; he was knocked out of the sample.  
If the patient died, it wouldn’t affect that surgeon’s mortality rate.  “I called him, 
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Not only state and federal authorities, but also private insurers 
are trying to rate doctors’ quality.76  Insurers and other raters try to 
make reams of tables and graphs accessible to consumers by boiling 
them down into grades and scores.77  Highly rated physicians appreci-
ate the publicity and endorsement but others “say that the data often 
contain errors and that doctors often lack the ability to correct 
them.”78  Conflicts proliferate, including “a lawsuit in Seattle” and a 
“physician revolt in St. Louis”79  These acts of resistance reflect both 
guild protectionism and legitimate concerns about misleading charac-
terization or unfair stigmatization of high-quality physicians. 
Fearing an unfair tiering of its members, the Washington State 
Medical Association filed suit against Regence BlueShield, an insur-
ance company that evaluated doctors using allegedly inaccurate and 
outdated information.80  The doctors claimed that Regence used four-
                                                        
and he sort of hemmed and hawed about it,” Brown remembers.  “I was going to 
report it, because I thought it was assault.  Certainly it was done strictly to ma-
nipulate the data.” 
Id. 
 76.  See Kristin Madison, Defragmenting Health Care Delivery Through Quality Reporting, in 
THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 87, 97 (Einer El-
hauge ed., 2010) (discussing various entities that are developing ways to measure perfor-
mance quality within the health care industry).  I have also called for more data develop-
ment as a goal of health care policy in an essay on specialty hospitals.  See Frank Pasquale, 
Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information—Forcing Regulatory 
Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 140, 165, 
235, 250–51 (Einer Elhauge, ed., 2010) (describing research commissioned by the U.S. 
government in efforts to rate level of care provided by specialty hospitals). 
 77.  See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362 (2012) (“User-generated feedback 
on physicians has found multiple fora on the Internet, including: Angie’s List, Yelp, and 
specialty sites like RateMDs.com.”).   
 78.  Nakashima, supra note 66. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Washington Doctors Sue Blues Plan over Performance Standards, 
AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/10/ 
16/prsd1016.htm (“The Washington State Medical Assn. is suing Regence BlueShield, 
claiming the health plan defamed physicians when it told thousands of patients that their 
doctors didn’t meet the ‘quality and efficiency’ standards needed to be included in the 
insurer’s new performance-based network.”); Judith VandeWater, Doctors Level Charges at 
Health Insurer, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 26, 2005, at A1; see also Lawsuit: Insurance 
Commission Physician Tiering Program Flawed, SURGISTRATEGIES (June 25, 2008), 
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year-old data, small sample sizes, and focused on the cost of claims ra-
ther than the quality of care.81  The complaint alleged defamation and 
violation of the Consumer Protection Act, among other causes of ac-
tion.82  After ten months of litigation, Regence agreed to settle with 
the Washington State Medical Association “in an effort to better un-
derstand physician concerns,”83 voluntarily withdrawing the Select 
Network program.  The settlement agreement, effective for at least 
two years, promises transparency in evaluations and fair methodolo-
gy.84 
To the extent that insurance companies are rating and ranking 
doctors to guide members to the most effective care, they should be 
free to use properly anonymized claims data and freely publish their 
results.  If such rating systems are primarily driven by commercial 
concerns of the insurers to steer patients away from the high cost of 
doctors, however, that effort needs to be disclosed and perhaps de-
terred.  Quality regulators have already adopted some of these princi-
ples, but they need to be more clearly articulated as rating sites prolif-
erate. 
In New York, then-Attorney General (and now Governor) An-
drew Cuomo launched an investigation of insurers’ physician ratings 
                                                        
http://www.surgicenteronline.com/hotnews/insurance-commission-physician-tiering.html 
(describing the lawsuit). 
 81.  See Judith VandeWater, BJC Warns It May Drop United Healthcare, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter VandeWater, BJC Warns] (describing physi-
cian concerns); Doctors Outraged at Ratings, OREGONIAN, May 26, 2006, at D4. 
 82.  VandeWater, BJC Warns, supra note 81. 
 83.  Judith VandeWater, BJC, Health Insurer Resolve Dispute, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 24, 2005, at A1. 
 84.  Id.  Had the suit gone to trial, First Amendment defenses may have been raised.  
See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in 
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 117–19 (2010) (discussing the successful First 
Amendment defense of the Avvo lawyer ratings site).  There were several possible causes of 
action.  See CHRISTINE C. RINN, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, TIERED PHYSICIAN NETWORKS: 
A NEW TWIST ON AN OLD ISSUE 4–7 (2008), available at http://www.crowell.com/ 
documents/Tiered_Physician_Networks_AHLA_Rinnpdf.pdf (discussing potential causes 
of action in ranking and rating cases, including: “breach of contract;” “defamation;” “con-
sumer protection violations;” “unfair insurance practices;” “tortious interference with con-
tractual relations;” “fraud;” and “conspiracy”); Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Will Pay-for-
Performance and Quality Reporting Affect Health Care Disparities?, 28 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) 
w405, w405–12 (2007) (suggesting design elements likely to help create fair evaluation 
methods). 
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that culminated in settlement agreements in 2007.  Cuomo claimed 
that the evaluation programs were confusing and unfair to both phy-
sicians and consumers.85  After negotiating with his office, insurance 
companies eventually agreed to follow the ranking guidelines in a na-
tional model provided by the Office of the Attorney General (in co-
operation and consultation with the American Medical Association 
and other provider trade organizations).86  The model agreements 
required “insurers to fully disclose to consumers and physicians all as-
pects of their ranking system.”87  Since there is mandatory disclosure 
of all data and methodologies, the problem of the “black box” evalua-
tion system is greatly reduced under the model agreements.  Larger 
insurers capitulated to state demands, starting a trend toward trans-
parent, quality-based rankings with public methodologies.88  A Patient 
Charter for Physician Performance Measurement has also emerged as 
a project of the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project.89  The specif-
ic terms of the charter call for evaluations that are “meaningful to 
consumers” and bar decontextualized ratings based solely on cost. 
These developments are encouraging, but even the regulated rat-
ing systems are far from reaching their potential.  Patients may seek 
more granular data.  For example, a group that does very well with 
one subset of patients (say, diabetics) may not be as adept at treating 
others.  Moreover, as Kristin Madison has argued, “particularly for 
process-oriented and outcome-oriented measures, limitations on 
available data and statistical techniques complicate efforts to develop 
statistically reliable quality measures that differentiate providers suffi-
                                                        
 85.  See Agreement Between Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen. of the State of N.Y., 
and CIGNA Healthcare of N.Y., Inc., Concerning Physician Performance Measurement, 
Reporting and Tiering Programs 3 (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites 
/default/files/press-releases/archived/CIGNA%20Settlement%20Final.pdf (“The Attor-
ney General finds that any initiatives to measure quality and cost-efficiency of physi-
cians . . . have the potential to cause confusion . . . and could result in a violation of law.”). 
 86.  Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen. Office, Attorney General Cuomo Announces Doctor 
Ranking Agreement with GHI and HIP (Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-doctor-ranking-agreement-ghi-and-hip. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See E-mail from Linda Lacewell, Chair of the N.Y. Att’y Gen. Health Care Task 
Force, to Frank Pasquale (Oct. 27, 2008) (on file with author) (“CIGNA and other plans 
have agreed to disclose their methodologies to the public.”).   
 89.  See id. 
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ciently to make quality ratings meaningful.”90  The developing nation-
al health information infrastructure, as well as state level health in-
formation exchanges and system-level network building, need to ad-
dress this data drought. 
C.  Perplexing Prices 
Given the potential complexity of medical interventions, it is 
perhaps understandable that quality information is difficult to gather, 
analyze, and disseminate.91  Even pricing information has proven elu-
sive for patients, and sometimes even for doctors, hospitals, and in-
surers.  Each of these health care players can obscure the costs of 
their services to maximize opportunities for price discrimination or 
even price gouging.92 
                                                        
 90.  Madison, supra note 73, at 228.  A quick consultation of sites like Hospital Com-
pare and Nursing Home Compare helps validate Madison’s contention here.  Very dispar-
ate entities can appear almost indistinguishable given the crudeness of the categories used 
to assess quality.  Conversely, something like Google’s Zagat ratings, now applied to some 
hospitals, wraps a non-transparent process of evaluation in a patina of objectivity, and in 
my experience has applied mysterious and unjustified scores to health care entities. 
 91.  In the context of a discussion of rationing and insurance companies efforts to de-
vise approved lists of interventions, one health law textbook suggests that a mapping of 
possible condition-treatment combinations “would require rigorous scientific information 
on each of the almost 10,000 diagnostic entries in the International Classification of Diseases 
(9th ed. 1979) (known as ‘‘ICD-9’’) and for each of the 10,000 medical interventions listed 
in the AMA’s Common Procedural Terminology (known as ‘‘CPT’’ codes).”  MARK A. HALL, 
MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 345 (7th ed. 
2007).  The ICD-10, which should be adopted in the U.S. in 2014, having long been the 
standard in other industrialized nations, has about seven times more codes than ICD-9.  
Press Release, Health & Human Servs., HHS Issues Final ICD-10 Code Sets and Updated 
Electronic Transaction Standards Rules (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2009pres/01/20090115f.html; see also Dan Bowman, New ICD-10 Deadline Pro-
posed for 2014, FIERCEHEALTHIT (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/new-
icd-10-deadline-proposed-2014/2012-04-09. 
 92.  Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Price-Gouging by Doctors and Hospitals, HEALTH 
REFORM WATCH (July 19, 2009), available at http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/07 
/19/price-gouging-by-doctors-and-hospitals/ (“Providers routinely double, triple, or even 
quadruple prices for unprotected patients.” (emphasis omitted)); Gerard F. Anderson, 
From ‘Soak the Rich’ to ‘Soak the Poor’: Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 
780 (2007) (explaining that rates charged to many “uninsured and other ‘self-pay’ pa-
tients” for hospital services were often “2.5 times what most public and private health in-
surers actually pay”).   
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There is a remarkable lack of uniformity in health care prices in 
many U.S. markets.  For example, the Boston Globe reported that coro-
nary bypass procedures generated median insurance company pay-
ments over $17,000 more at Massachusetts General Hospital than at 
the Boston Medical Center.93  Imaging services, such as MRIs, CT-
scans, and ultrasounds, featured similar spreads between the highest- 
and lowest-cost providers.94  Though Massachusetts General Hospital 
is reputed to be one of the best hospitals in the world, experts 
claimed that the differences in price did not reflect commensurate 
differences in quality.  Rather, the market power of Massachusetts 
General Hospital as a “must-have” hospital for private insurers let it 
charge much more for its services.95 
In ordinary markets, publicity would tend to narrow the price dif-
ferential between similar quality services.  In health care, however, 
there is a triple layer of agency between care and patients whose phy-
sicians’ recommendations are often constrained by an insurer that is 
chosen by the patient’s employer or government.96  Even if we assume 
away the agency problems in such an arrangement, it is difficult for 
buyers and sellers to truly understand “market” dynamics.  As health 
economist Uwe Reinhardt has observed, “[o]nly a handful of Ameri-
cans truly comprehend the complex payment system for U.S. hospi-
tals—mostly those whose job it is to set, negotiate, and study hospital 
prices.”97 
                                                        
 93.  Comparable Quality, Different Prices, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 16, 2008), 
http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2008/11/16/differentprices/. 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  For example, an MRI of the ankle that costs around $1,100 at Boston Children’s 
Hospital would only be around $500 at Boston Medical Center. Scott Allen & Marcella 
Bombardieri, A Healthcare System Badly Out of Balance, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2008, at A1.  
The health policy literature has documented wide price variations throughout the United 
States.  Todd P. Gilmer & Richard G. Kronick, Differences in the Volume of Services and in Pric-
es Drive Big Variations in Medicaid Spending Among U.S. States and Regions, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
1316, 1317 (2011) (“We find substantial variations both in the volume of services and in 
prices.”). 
 96.  Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Place-
bo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 819–20 (2011); see also Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monop-
sony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem for Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 949, 949 (2004) 
(describing a “three-level model of industrial production—comprised of provider-
suppliers, insurer-producers, and patient-consumers”). 
 97.  Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 57–58 (2006). 
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In theory, an “info-mediary” could work for consumers and try to 
interpret the data to offer simpler accounts of what care actually costs.  
The rise of a movement advocating “consumer-directed health re-
form” during the Bush administration led to some small steps toward 
pricing transparency.  Yet trade secrecy law still enables obfuscation of 
critical data.98  Even aspects of Medicare spending have remained 
opaque.99 
Perhaps a coalition of insurers could band together to gain 
enough bargaining power to demand transparency, carefully avoiding 
the antitrust questions that could arise if such coordination became 
too aggressive.  Other intermediaries might also arise.  But the record 
of at least one such intermediary, Group Purchasing Organizations 
(“GPOs”), is not promising.  GPOs are supposed to use purchasing 
                                                        
 98. Id. at 62 (“[A]ctual dollar payments [paid by insurers to hospitals] have traditional-
ly been kept as strict, proprietary trade secrets by both the hospitals and the insurers.  Re-
cently Aetna announced that it will make public the actual payment rates it has negotiated 
with physicians in the Cincinnati area. That this small, tentative step toward transparency 
made national news speaks volumes about the state of price-transparency in U.S. health 
care.”); see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device 
Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
187, 188 (2009) (discussing claims by the medical device manufacturer Guidant/Boston 
Scientific that the actual prices its hospital customers pay for implantable devices, includ-
ing cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators, are protectable as trade secrets under the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act). 
 99.  See Consumer’s Checkbook Loses Appeal in Medicare Data Case, FINDLAW (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://commonlaw.findlaw.com/2009/02/consumers-checkbook-loses-appeal-in-
medicare-data-case.html (reporting that a consumer group’s attempt to access Medicare 
payment records as a means of evaluating doctor performance failed in court).  It must be 
acknowledged, however, that Medicare releases a great deal of information at low costs 
that might be ten to twenty times more expensive in the hands of a company like IMS 
Health.  See Mark Schoofs & Maurice Tamman, In Medicare’s Data Trove, Clues to Curing Cost 
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2010, at A1 (“Federal investigators use the database to find 
fraud; academic researchers mine it to compare the cost and utilization of various services; 
and consultants make a business out of analyzing the data for a wide variety of health-care 
companies.”); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Feds to Allow Use of Medicare Data to Rate Doctors, 
MINN. NPR (Dec. 5, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/12/05/ 
feds-allow-medicare-data-to-rate-doctors/ (“Medicare’s database is considered the mother 
lode of health care information.  Tapping it has largely been forbidden because of a dec-
ades-old court ruling that releasing the information would violate the privacy of doc-
tors. . . .  [PPACA] changed federal law to explicitly authorize release of the infor-
mation.”). 
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clout on behalf of buyers (like hospitals) to drive down prices from 
sellers.100  It appears, however, that these intermediaries are often 
more interested in fees and payments from the sell-side than they are 
in helping the buy-side.  As one analyst testified before the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 
“the compensation of most GPO management is almost always based 
on . . . fee income [from suppliers] rather than on the real savings to 
hospital members.”101  Such intermediaries are often tempted to put 
their own profits ahead of the entities they are ostensibly serving.  In 
the endless battle for compensation between providers, hospitals, and 
insurers, there are many profitable opportunities to shift alliances. 
Complex contracts may also limit the transparency of pricing.  As 
Uwe Reinhardt has documented: 
Relative to hospitals paid under the much simpler national 
health insurance schemes in other countries, the contract-
ing and billing departments of U.S. hospitals . . . are huge 
enterprises, often requiring large cadres of highly skilled 
                                                        
 100.  Robert E. Litan, Hal Singer & Anna Birkenbach, An Empirical Analysis of Aftermarket 
Transactions by Hospitals, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 36 (2011) (“GPOs play an 
important role in brokering transactions between hospitals and medical device suppliers.  
Our empirical findings suggest that hospitals can achieve significant savings relative to the 
GPO-negotiated price through participation in medical-device aftermarkets.”).  But see S. 
PRAKASH SETHI, GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE xiv (2009) (calling for “greater transparency and accountability” 
in the industry); S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 111TH CONG., EMPIRICAL DATA LACKING TO 
SUPPORT CLAIMS OF SAVINGS WITH GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2010), available 
at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/2010-09-24-GPO-Report.pdf. 
 101.  Elizabeth Weatherman, Testimony at FTC/DOJ Hearing (Sept. 26, 2003), in 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION 38 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723 
healthcarerpt.pdf.  As Mariah Blake explains: “[I]n 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting 
GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare law.  This meant that in-
stead of collecting membership dues, GPOs could collect ‘fees’—in other industries they 
might be called kickbacks or bribes—from suppliers in the form of a share of sales reve-
nue.”  Mariah Blake, Dirty Medicine, WASH. MONTHLY, July–Aug. 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.blake.html; see also EINER 
ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF GPO EXCLUSIONARY AGREEMENTS (Sept. 26, 2003), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/statement_ftcdoj.pdf (“Serious anti-
trust concerns remain about exclusionary agreements that charge higher prices to GPOs 
or hospitals that won’t commit to limiting purchases from rivals of dominant manufactur-
ers to a small (often 5–10%) percentage of their purchases.”).   
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workers backed up by sophisticated computer systems that 
can simulate the revenue implications of the individual con-
tract negotiations.102 
Given that U.S. doctors’ administrative costs are four times more 
than Canadian doctors’ costs, consumers might expect a clearer pic-
ture of the financial landscape.103  Instead, complexity mainly serves to 
protect the business models of established players.  If consumer-
driven health care advocates ask hospitals to reveal more, a plaintive 
chorus will respond that true prices are irredeemably opaque.  For 
what is market freedom if it does not include the right to contract in-
to a dynamically multivariate payment scheme where the cost of a ser-
vice constantly changes because it depends on dozens of factors? 
Doctors and insurers are not the only ones obscuring health care 
costs.  As Steve Pearlstein has observed, “[t]he prescription drug mar-
ket . . . is renowned for its lack of transparency.”104  Drug companies 
not only refuse to reveal their wholesale prices, but in contracting 
with pharmacy chains and Pharmacy Benefits Management (“PBMs”) 
they insist on contracts that prohibit either party from revealing pric-
es to anyone else.”105  As Annemarie Bridy has shown, a medical device 
manufacturer may claim that “the actual prices its hospital customers 
pay for implantable devices, including cardiac pacemakers and defib-
                                                        
 102.  Reinhardt, supra note 97, at 59. 
 103.  Dante Morra et al., U.S. Physician Practices Versus Canadians: Spending Nearly Four 
Times As Much Money Interacting With Payers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1443, 1443 (2011) (“Total 
health spending per capita in the United States, adjusted for differences in purchasing 
power, is 87 percent more than in Canada ($7,290 compared to $3,895 per year).  Many 
factors contribute to the high cost of health care in the United States, but there is broad 
consensus that administrative costs in the health care system are high and could be re-
duced.  Interactions between physician practices and health insurance plans are one 
prominent component of administrative costs.”).  For concrete examples of the inefficien-
cies involved, see Steven Ringel, Practicing Medicine Versus Pushing Paper, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
1200, 1200 (2011) (“I’ve completed the same form several years in a row.  Every year the 
answers are the same—the message does not change: Kyle is profoundly weak, is restricted 
to a wheelchair, and needs assistance with all activities of daily living . . . .  Yet if I don’t fill 
out this year’s form, the services Kyle relies on will be denied.”). 
 104.  Steven Pearlstein, Sunday Pearlstein: End of the ‘Anything Goes’ Era of Antitrust?, 
WASH. POST: EZRA KLEIN’S WONKBLOG (Dec. 11, 2011, 8:11 AM), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/sunday-pearlstein-end-of-the-anything-goes-era-of-
antitrust/2011/12/11/gIQAEUcJmO_blog.html. 
 105.  Id. 
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rillators, are protectable as trade secrets under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.”106 
Rebecca Busch has documented how complex relationships be-
tween providers, employers, insurers, vendors, and patients create 
ample opportunities for fraud.107  They have also created unfortunate 
opportunities for powerful or crafty players in the industry to block 
accountability.  Can a market work when buyers are kept in the dark 
about the prices they will pay?  The question is increasingly urgent for 
those who believe market forces can improve outcomes and reduce 
health care spending.  In theory, consumers could force doctors and 
hospitals to compete by shopping around for services.  But informed 
consumption is more easily described than implemented. 
D.  Missing Electronic Health Records 
Combine the opacity described above with the bargaining power 
enjoyed by many American health care’s key players, and inexplicably 
varied (and sometimes astronomical) costs are a foregone conclu-
sion.108  An MRI that costs, on average, $1,080 in America costs $280 
in France.109  That average figure also hides wide variations within the 
United States.  A 2004 study showed massive dispersion in California 
hospital prices: A blood test that costs less than $200 in San Francisco 
                                                        
 106.  Bridy, supra note 98, at 206 & n.109. 
 107.  REBECCA S. BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND DETECTION GUIDE 52 
(2012) (discussing “15 layers of fragmentation” in health care); Robert Radick, Claims Data 
and Health Care Fraud: The Controversy Continues, FORBES, Sept. 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/09/25/claims-data-and-health-care-fraud-the-
controversy-continues; New Technology To Help Fight Medicare Fraud, FIERCE HEALTHIT (June 
22, 2011), available at http://www.fiercehealthit.com/press-releases/new-technology-help-
fight-medicare-fraud. 
 108.  Joseph White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 85(3) 
MILBANK Q. 395, 413  (2007) (describing bargaining power imbalances and their effect on 
prices in U.S. health care). 
 109.  Ezra Klein, Why an MRI costs $1,080 in America and $280 in France, WASH. POST: 
EZRA KLEIN’S WONKBLOG (Mar. 3, 2012, 12:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/ezra-klein/post/why-an-mri-costs-1080-in-america-and-280-in-france/2011/08/25/ 
gIQAVHztoR_blog.html?fb_ref=NetworkNews (“Medicare and Medicaid negotiate prices 
on behalf of their tens of millions of members and, not coincidentally, purchase care at a 
substantial markdown from the commercial average.  But outside that, it’s a free-for-all.”).   
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might be $1,500 at Doctors Medical Center in Modesto.110  One need 
not be a devotee of all-payer rate settings to conclude that these dif-
ferences may result more from bargaining power than from actual dif-
ferences in quality. 
Better technology could help regulators and consumers under-
stand the true value proposition of insurers, doctors, and providers.  
It could also cut costs from duplicative tests and uncoordinated care.  
But electronic health record adoption has lagged in the United 
States.  As Nicolas Terry has observed, “by 2009 only seventeen per-
cent of U.S. doctors and ten percent of hospitals had even basic Elec-
tronic Medical Record systems” and “fewer than two percent of U.S. 
hospitals had comprehensive systems.”111  There is a strange discon-
nect between the wonders of Silicon Valley, where the United States 
leads the world in search and social networking, and the dismal mid-
den of faxes and manila folders littering many doctors’ offices.112  
While other industries have been spending ten percent or so of annu-
al costs on information technology, the health care industry has bare-
ly spent more than two percent of its annual costs. 
Despite the polarized health policy landscape, a consensus 
emerged in 2009 around the need to subsidize electronic health rec-
ords.  The United States took a major step toward establishing such 
an infrastructure in the HITECH Act of 2009.113  The Act established 
                                                        
 110.  Lucette Lagnado, California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price Differences, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A1. 
 111.  Nicolas Terry, Anticipating Stage II: Assessing the Development of Meaningful Use and 
EMR Deployment, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 103, 103 (2012) [hereinafter Terry, Anticipating]; 
see also Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1628, 1631 (2009) (concluding that only 1.5% of U.S. hospitals have a comprehen-
sive electronic records system); Richard Hillested et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems 
Transform Health Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 
1103 (2005) (noticing that most records “are still stored on paper”); Robert H. Miller and 
Ida Sim, Physicians’ Use of Electronic Medical Records: Barriers and Solutions, 23 HEALTH AFF 
116, 117–18 (2004) (detailing the results of a study on physicians’ EMR usage). 
 112.  See Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Electronic Health Records in Ambulatory Care: A Na-
tional Survey of Physicians, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 54 (2008) (reporting a dearth of elec-
tronic record usage); Jha, supra note 111, at 1631 (same). 
 113.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009); Mark Faccenda and Lara Parkin, Meaningful Use—What Does It Mean To You?, 23 
HEALTH L. 10, 10 (2011) (citing ARRA, Title IV, Subtitles A and B).  But see generally Larry 
Wolf, Jennie Harvell and Ashish K. Jha, Hospitals Ineligible for Federal Meaningful-Use Incen-
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incentive programs for eligible hospitals and professionals adopting 
and meaningfully using certified electronic health record (“EHR”) 
technology.114  Computational innovation may improve health care by 
creating stores of observational data to complement traditional clini-
cal research.115  President Obama called HITECH “an investment that 
will take the long overdue step of computerizing America’s medical 
records to reduce the duplication and waste that costs billions of 
health care dollars and medical errors that cost thousands of lives 
each year.”116 
                                                        
tives Have Dismally Low Rates of Adoption of Electronic Health Records, 31 HEALTH AFF. 505 
(2012) (discussing providers explicitly excluded from incentive programs). 
 114.  Bob Brown, What Is a “Certified EHR?,” 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 31, 31 
(2010); see generally Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of 
Electronic Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43 (2011) [hereinafter Ter-
ry, Certification and Meaningful Use] (examining meaningful use as the condition for receiv-
ing EHR subsidy funds). 
 115.  OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., ACCELERATING THE ADOPTION OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION (2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/reports 
/plans/onc_hit.pdf; SAMHSA, SUBSTANCES ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., 
SAMHSA’S WEEKLY FINANCING NEWS PULSE: NATIONAL EDITION, July 23, 2010, at 3, availa-
ble at http://www.samhsa.gov/financing/file.axd?file=2010%2f10%2f2010_10_Weekly 
FinancingNewsPulseNationalEditionfinal20100723.pdf (reporting that the new program 
will direct $27 billion for CMS and $2 billion for the ONC).  About $30 billion in subsidies 
were appropriated for this purpose. CMS Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Time-
line, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/ 
EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/EHRIncentProgtimeline508V1.pdf. 
 116.  President Barack Obama, Remarks at Stimulus Bill Signing (Feb. 17, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.sequelmed.com/Stimulus/; see also Federico Girosi, Robin Meili & Rich-
ard Scoville, Extrapolating Evidence of Health Information Technology Savings and Costs, RAND 
CORP. MONOGRAPH (2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG 
410.pdf.  But see Steve Lohr, Digital Records May Not Cut Health Costs, Study Cautions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at B1 (citing more recent data); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
EVIDENCE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9168/05-
20-healthit.pdf (criticizing the RAND study).  Given such conflicting findings, it is reassur-
ing to note that a meta-study concluded that ninety-two percent of recent articles on 
health IT did find positive benefits overall.  M.B. Buntin et al., The Benefits of Health Infor-
mation Technology: A Review of the Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 464, 465 (2011). 
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The Act has already catalyzed diffusion of electronic medical 
records by providing billions of dollars in subsidies to hospitals and 
physicians.117  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(“ARRA”) does more than subsidize; it conditions funding on the 
“meaningful use” of electronic medical records.118  “Meaningful use” 
regulations define how functional an EHR system has to be before its 
user can receive subsidies.119 Electronic health records are to include 
basic information such as patient demographics, clinical health in-
formation, and medical history.120  The law focuses on incentives to 
improve quality, safety, efficiency, and care coordination; engage pa-
tients and families; and improve population health, all while protect-
ing privacy, confidentiality and security.121  Meaningful use require-
ments are phased in over a six-year period, in three stages.  Stage 1 
focuses on basic information and demographics.122 
                                                        
 117.  An electronic health record (“EHR”) is “an electronic record of health-related in-
formation on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted by author-
ized health care clinicians and staff.” 42 U.S.C. § 17921 (2006).  This paper uses the terms 
EHR and EMR (electronic medical record) interchangeably, though in the future an EHR 
might more accurately designate a more comprehensive record (relating to all pieces of 
information related to one’s health, as opposed to mere medical care).  This appears to be 
the ONC’s view.  See Peter Garrett and Joshua Seidman, EMR vs. EHR, HEALTHITBUZZ 
(Jan. 4, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-and-
medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/ (describing the difference between using EHR 
and EMR). 
 118.  Camella B. Boateng, Federal Electronic Health Records Incentive Programs: What They 
Mean for Compliance Officers, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 17, 18 (2010) (“The meaning-
ful use objectives are divided into two groups: (1) core set and (2) menu set objectives.  
The core set contains 14 required objectives that eligible hospitals must fulfill to receive 
bonus payments.  The menu set has 10 objectives, and hospitals must select and meet five 
objectives for payment purposes.”).  
 119.  David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electron-
ic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010); Terry, supra note 111. 
 120.  42 U.S.C. § 300jj(13)(2006). 
 121.  Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Elec-
tronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 691–96. 
 122.  See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,328 (proposed July 
28, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 422) (listing the “core set of meaning-
ful use objectives” for Stage 1). Capabilities include: recording smoking status and body 
mass index; present clinical data on individual patients, including medication list, medica-
tion allergy list, problem and current diagnosis list, and a clinical summary; generate lists 
of patients by specific condition and allows communication with patients for reminders 
 2013] GRAND BARGAINS FOR BIG DATA 711 
The HITECH Act also mandated that the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”) establish procedures for certifying 
health information technology so that providers can be assured that 
their technology meets basic standards.123  The “Standards Rule” fo-
cuses on basic benchmarks for data entry and portability.124  Such cer-
tified EHRs must include capacities that “enable providers to achieve 
meaningful use as it is currently constituted in Phase 1 of HHS’ regu-
lations.”125  The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Infor-
mation Technology (“ONC”) delegates certification authority to Au-
thorized Testing and Certification Bodies (“ATCBs”), which will 
follow standards developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization.126 
The meaningful use and certification standards are a compre-
hensive, complex effort to create the rules and standards that can 
support a twenty-first-century health IT infrastructure.  The standards 
have succeeded in many ways,127 despite the fact that David Blumen-
thal has conceded that CMS and ONC “were in many ways unpre-
pared to undertake” the task of leading “the creation of a nationwide, 
interoperable, private, and secure electronic health information sys-
                                                        
and such; allow patients timely access to their EMR that the system allow providers to sub-
mit claims for payment and information to public health authorities electronically.  Id. 
 123.  45 C.F.R. § 170 (2010); Proposed Establishment of Certification Programs for 
Health Information Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,328 (proposed March 10, 2010) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170); Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, 
Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record 
Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,590 (proposed July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
170). 
 124.  Brown, supra note 114, at 66. 
 125.  Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Meaningful Use and Certification of Health In-
formation Technology: What About Safety?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS s77, s78 (Supp. 2011) [here-
inafter Hoffman & Podgurski, Meaningful Use].   
 126.  Id. 
 127.  David J. Brailer, David Brailer & Farzad Mostashari: Two National Health IT Czars 
Compare Notes, 31 HEALTH AFF. 475, 475 (2012) (“In mid-February 2012, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius announced that nearly 2,000 US hospitals 
and more than 41,000 doctors have now met the standards for achieving meaningful use 
of health information technology and have received $3.1 billion in federal incentive pay-
ments as a result.”).   
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tem” in 2009.128  Blumenthal has argued that “the HITECH Act may 
have spurred a rapid increase in the adoption of EHRs.”129 
Unfortunately, other developments in health information tech-
nology threaten to undermine policies of openness.130  According to 
Phillip Longman, subsidies could be directed to proprietary systems 
that prevent widespread study and utilization of health records.131  
Longman worried that several proprietary systems increase the chance 
of medical error due to restrictive licensing agreements that prohibit 
users from fully understanding aspects of the system that cause prob-
lems.132 
In 2011, EHR experts Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski 
sounded another note of alarm about the development of digitized 
health infrastructure.133  They argued that early rounds of regulations 
relating to health information technology failed to address safety con-
cerns: “General system safety is a property that is attainable only 
through rigorous processes for development and evaluation.  The 
                                                        
 128.  Blumenthal, supra note 6.  Blumenthal was National Coordinator of Health In-
formation Technology in charge at the time the ARRA was adopted.  He has confirmed 
that consultation with outside experts helped the process along.  Id.  ONC and CMS were 
fortunate that the HITECH Act created two new federal committees to advise them: a 
Health Information Technology Policy Committee (“HITPC”) and a Health Information 
Technology Standards Committee (“HITSC”).  The former was to provide general policy 
advice, and the latter to help with developing standards, implementation specifications, 
and certification criteria for EHRs.  In hundreds of open meetings of the HITSC, the 
HITPC, and its many working groups, scores of experts contributed tens of thousands of 
free hours to helping HHS make the HITECH Act work.  Id. 
 129.  Blumenthal, supra note 6, at 2427–28. 
 130.  Cost of implementation is the first impediment; one study estimated that the first 
sixty days of implementation in a primary care setting would cost over $30,000 and con-
sume 134 hours of physician time.  N.S. Fleming et al., The Financial and Nonfinancial Costs 
of Implementing Electronic Health Records in Primary Care Practices, 30 HEALTH AFF. 481, 482 
(2011).   
 131.  Phillip Longman, Code Red: How Software Companies Could Screw Up Obama’s Health 
Care Reform, 41 WASH. MONTHLY 19, 20–22 (2009). 
 132.  Id. at 23 (“Perversely, license agreements usually bar users of proprietary health IT 
systems from reporting dangerous bugs to other health care facilities.  In open-source sys-
tems, users learn from each other’s mistakes; in proprietary ones, they’re not even allowed 
to mention them.”). 
 133.   Hoffman & Podgurski, Meaningful Use, supra note 125.  These concerns were antic-
ipated in Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Elec-
tronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1527 (2009). 
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regulations, however, do not address certification of EHR vendors’ 
software development processes or even require vendors to analyze 
and mitigate potential safety hazards.”134 
A critical mass of incidents has demonstrated the dangers of mal-
functioning and insecure software.135  Though health care settings are 
often beset with urgent developments, ATCBs will use testing re-
quirements that do not even attempt to approximate the “varied op-
erating conditions” that will challenge systems over the long term.136  
Since a system that is “safe at one facility can experience safety prob-
lems when customized by other users,” this may prove a serious source 
of preventable errors and substandard care.137 
Whereas Hoffman and Podgurski critiqued the certification pro-
cess for technology for lack of rigor, Nicolas Terry has focused on 
meaningful use requirements for providers that similarly shrink from 
genuine accountability.138  Terry has worried that even “meaningful 
use” of EHRs may leave data trapped in silos and inaccessible for 
many important purposes.139  Without “metadata that provides patient 
identifying information, privacy protocols, and provenance relating to 
that data element,” EHRs could not live up to their full potential in 
monitoring and improving aggregate health outcomes.140  Though 
ONC has begun to develop such standards for summary care rec-
ords,141 it may be a case of too little, too late.  Excessive solicitude to-
                                                        
 134.  Hoffman & Podgurski, Meaningful Use, supra note 125, at s78 (footnote omitted). 
 135.  Bad Health Informatics Can Kill, INST. OF HEALTH INFORMATICS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
available at http://iig.umit.at/efmi/badinformatics.htm (providing “summaries of a num-
ber of reported incidents in healthcare where [insecure software] was the cause or a signif-
icant factor”); Steven Lohr, Seeing Promise and Peril in Digital Records, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2011, at BU3. 
 136.  Hoffman & Podgurski, Meaningful Use, supra note 125, at s78. 
 137.  Id. at s79. 
 138.  See Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use, supra note 114, at 48 (citing the “lack of 
provider enthusiasm for investing in EHR technology”). 
 139.  Terry, Anticipating, supra note 111, at 110 (“Where PCAST was insightful (and 
clearly differed from the CMS/ONC approach) was in viewing data exchange as a major 
priority (for patient care, health research, and to create network value and so stimulate 
adoption) and in its skepticism for useful data exchange emerging from the current gen-
eration of EMRs, even when supported by Health Information Exchanges (“HIE”).”). 
 140.  Id. at 111. 
 141.  See 45 C.F.R. § 170 (2010) (creating Metadata Standards To Support Nationwide 
Electronic Health Information Exchange). 
 714 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:682 
ward IT vendors may be compromising the effectiveness of the emerg-
ing EHR infrastructure.142 
Moreover, patients’ perspectives have not been adequately 
acknowledged and incorporated into standards.143  Many patients 
want to download their health data onto their own computers and 
applications.144  Several entities have provided platforms for doing 
so,145 promoting “personal health records” (“PHRs”).146  Despite a 
growing “quantified self”147 movement that embraces such records, in-
compatible data entry standards have stymied even the most techno-
logically advanced companies.  For example, consider the story of one 
“tech-savvy” kidney cancer survivor featured in the Boston Globe: 
When Dave deBronkart . . . tried to transfer his medical rec-
ords from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center to Google 
Health, a new free service that lets patients keep all their 
health records in one place and easily share them with new 
doctors, he was stunned at what he found.  Google said his 
                                                        
 142.  For a case study in vendor resistance to more ambitious standards, see Anthony 
Guerra, Health IT Advisers Blast Data Exchange Policies, INFORMATIONWEEK (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/leadership/health-it-advisers-blast-data-
exchange-p/229400737 (discussing tensions between PCAST and the approach to fair in-
formation practices being developed by Tiger Team (Workgroup on Privacy and Securi-
ty)). 
 143.  HEALTH RESEARCH INST., PUTTING PATIENTS INTO “MEANINGFUL USE” 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/putting-patients-
into-meaningful-use.jhtml (finding that “[p]atient awareness of and access to available 
health IT tools is low”). 
 144.  Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Roundtable: Personal Health Records, Understanding the Evolving Landscape 
(Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/ 
healthit_hhs_gov_personal_health_records_-_phr_roundtable/3169 (transcript). 
 145.  See MICROSOFT HEALTHVAULT, www.microsoft.com/en-us/healthvault/ (last visit-
ed Oct. 25, 2012); AETNA CAREENGINE, http://www.aetna.com/showcase/phr/ (last visit-
ed Oct. 25, 2012); MY HEALTHEVET, https://www.myhealth.va.gov/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2012); BLUE BUTTON, http://www.va.gov/bluebutton/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 146.  A Personal Health Record is “an electronic record . . . that is managed, shared, 
and controlled by or primarily for the individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 17921(11) (2006); see also 
16 C.F.R. § 318.2(d) (2012); Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., supra 
note 144 (describing the range of personal health record systems).  
 147.  See, e.g., QUANTIFIED SELF, http://quantifiedself.com/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) 
(“A place for people interested in self-tracking to gather, share knowledge and experienc-
es, and discover resources.”). 
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cancer had spread to either his brain or spine—a frighten-
ing diagnosis deBronkart had never gotten from his doc-
tors—and listed an array of other conditions that he never 
had, as far as he knew, like chronic lung disease and aortic 
aneurysm.  A warning announced his blood pressure medi-
cation required “immediate attention.”  “I wondered, ‘What 
are they talking about?’” said deBronkart . . . .  [He] eventu-
ally discovered the problem: Some of the information in his 
Google Health record was drawn from billing records, which 
sometimes reflect imprecise information plugged into codes 
required by insurers.148 
According to one doctor consulted by the Globe, “an inaccurate 
diagnosis of gastrointestinal bleeding on a heart attack patient’s per-
sonal health record could stop an emergency room doctor from ad-
ministering a life-saving drug.”149  For the critically or chronically ill, 
the record is literally a life-or-death matter. 
Stories like deBronkart’s also suggest the limits of a personalized 
health record model.  The Center for Democracy and Technology has 
recommended that HHS require PHR vendors “to provide opportuni-
ties for consumers to amend, correct or annotate information in a 
PHR,” and “to have policies for handling disputes concerning infor-
mation in the PHR.”150  If regulators followed the same model as cred-
it reporting, patients should be able to review their reports without 
charge, and make corrections.151 
                                                        
 148.  Lisa Wangsness, Electronic Health Records Raise Doubt, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2009, at 
C1.  Google Health has since ceased operations. See David Talbot, How A Broken Medical 
System Killed Google Health, MIT TECH. REV. (June 29, 2011), http://technology 
review.com/news/424535/how-a-broken-medical-system-killed-google-health/ (noting that 
Google “is unwilling, for perfectly good business reasons, to engage in block-by-block mar-
ket solutions to health-care institutions one by one . . . and expecting patients to actually 
do data entry is not a scalable and workable solution.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 149.  Wangsness, supra note 148. 
 150.  CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECHNOLOGY TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATORʼS PHR ROUNDTABLE 3, 19 
(2010), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_Comment_to_ONC_PHR_Roundtable.pdf 
(arguing the need to build in a number of consumer safeguards to assure that other 
stakeholder interests do not trump patients’ interests). 
 151.  For a discussion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act model, see Frank Pasquale, Repu-
tation Regulation, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 111 (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., 
2010). 
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Conversely, the more control individuals have over a PHR (and 
the more verified it becomes), the more possibility there is that 
“[e]mployers, health plans, and others” might require “individuals to 
open PHR accounts as a condition of employment, membership, or 
for any other reason.”152  To verify participation in a wellness program, 
an employer may want access to an employee’s PHR, particularly if it 
is much easier for its own computer systems to read and understand 
than the “objective health record” existing in the health care system 
itself.  Yet the employer may also want to ensure that the PHR is popu-
lated by materials validated by third parties, such as doctors’ offices, 
fitness clubs, scales, or blood sugar monitors. 
Presently, this is not a major issue; Nicolas Terry’s 2009 observa-
tion that “sharing or exchange of data between PHRs and providers 
or their EHRs is as speculative as it is controversial” is still an accurate 
characterization of most patients’ experience.153  There are a few pio-
neer programs that are leading the way here, but they tend to be in-
tegrated into well-established health systems that have focused on in-
formation technology for decades.154  One has to look to other 
countries for more advanced adoption of health information tech-
nology.155  At their best, PHRs may help patients better manage their 
own conditions and join communities of interest online.  For exam-
ple, social networks like PatientsLikeMe.com have proven invaluable 
sources of support and advice.156 
                                                        
 152.  CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 150. 
 153.  Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 
1 DREXEL L. REV. 216, 226 (2009). 
 154.  Id. at 217 nn.10–11. 
 155.  News Release, The Commonwealth Fund, 100 Percent of Primary Care Doctors in 
Denmark Use Electronic Medical Records (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/News/News%20Releases/2010/Prot
ti%20Release%20Final%203910.pdf (“All primary care doctors in Demark use electronic 
medical records”); THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH POLICY SURVEY 
OF PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES (2009) (noting that the United States 
is near the bottom in measures of electronic medical record penetration and use among 
primary care physicians).  
 156.  PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).  Of 
course, these networks raise some difficult legal issues once patients’ privacy rights are 
considered.  For example, PatientsLikeMe was subject to a “scraper” which connected 
health information to some site users’ handles.  Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, ‘Scrapers’ 
Dig Deep for Data on Web, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010, at A1.  Sites like Spokeo can in turn re-
connect handles back to individuals.  SPOKEO, http://www.spokeo.com/ (last visited Nov. 
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Technological advances could promote PHRs with inputs from 
providers, apps, and even radio frequency identification chips.157  
What happens if an employer tries to condition participation in a 
wellness program on an employee’s agreement not to try to change 
whatever is reported by those trusted third parties?158  Patients must 
“buy in” to EHR for it to work effectively, and many will avoid any da-
ta-sharing environment where medical history can lead to denial of 
opportunities.159 
As ONC promulgates rules governing meaningful use, it is im-
portant that voices like deBronkart’s are heard.  So far, public dia-
logue on the process has been limited, and the main commenters are 
industry players.160  A predictable pattern has developed: HHS an-
nounces ambitious goals in proposed rules, commenters raise con-
cerns about technical feasibility, and requirements are scaled back 
somewhat in final rules.161  The broader purposes of health infor-
mation technology remain in the background. 
                                                        
17, 2012).  For a compelling analysis of how to address these concerns, see Nicolas P. Ter-
ry, Physicians and Patients Who “Friend” or “Tweet”: Constructing a Legal Framework for Social 
Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285, 286 (2010) (discussing both 
tort and administrative models of protection). 
 157.  Scott Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1153–56 (describing data gathering apps); 
MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, PROFILING THE  EUROPEAN  CITIZEN 15 (2009) (describing ubiqui-
tous health data gathering apps). 
 158.  Frank Pasquale, The End of “Notice and Consent” as Meaningful Privacy Protection, 
CYBERLAW JOTWELL (Feb. 3, 2012), http://cyber.jotwell.com/the-end-of-notice-and-
consent-as-meaningful-privacy-protection/ (offering an overview of the likely responses of 
data subjects).  
 159.  See id. (discussing patient distrust over privacy of personal data and examining 
three possible responses to avoid the harms of full disclosure). 
 160.  See HEALTH RESEARCH INST., supra note 143, at 1 (noting that “[t]he industry” has 
expressed concerns that the proposed requirements and timelines for Stage 2 of meaning-
ful use may be too aggressive). 
 161.  Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 119, at 502 (noting that the final regulations 
for Stage 1 of meaningful use incorporated changes in response to comments that the 
regulations were too demanding). 
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III.  ENVISIONING HEALTH CARE AS AN INFORMATION INDUSTRY 
Information gaps persistently compromise the delivery of high-
quality health care.162  Some of the gaps persist for good normative, 
legal, or technical reasons.163  Nevertheless, there can be little doubt 
that a good part of the hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in Amer-
ican health care annually is due to information failures.164 
The American health care industry must change: From Wall 
Street to Silicon Valley, from the Manhattan Institute to the Roosevelt 
Institute, that message is a constant.  By the time Tim Jost magisterial-
ly cataloged the failings of the U.S. health care system in his 2006 arti-
cle, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It, experts on health 
information had reached a policy consensus.165  Providers and insurers 
alike needed to use information technology to prevent error and im-
prove efficiency.  This Part explores several proposals for addressing 
the information gaps described in Part II. 
A.  Characteristics of Information Industries: Search, Analytics, and Co-
Creation 
The twin rise of information industries and globalization has led 
to a startling imbalance in American political economy.  As manufac-
tured goods and many services decline in price, health care costs re-
main stubbornly high.166  Within the United States, many commenta-
tors have argued that more intensive and extensive use of information 
                                                        
 162.  See Robert John Kane, Information Is the Key to Patient Empowerment, 11 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 25, 34 (2002). 
 163.  See id. at 31 (discussing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), which requires that health care information be kept private and confidential 
in accordance with universal privacy standards). 
 164.  Elise Viebeck, Institute of Medicine Says U.S. Healthcare System in Need of Giant Over-
haul, HEALTHWATCH (Sept. 6, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/health 
watch/other/247929-iom-us-healthcare-needs-giant-overhaul. 
 165.  Timothy Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on Health Law 
and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 608–13 (2006) (proposing a reform agenda that 
was very similar to many of the programs enacted in the Affordable Care Act of 2010).   
 166.  See Frank Pasquale, The Hippocratic Myth, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 529, 535 (2012) (review-
ing M. Gregg Bloche’s book, The Hippocratic Myth (2011) and examining “bloated” health 
care costs). 
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technology can improve quality and contain costs.167  It is helpful to 
review the key transformative aspects of information technology be-
fore discussing how it might address the problems raised in Part II. 
1.  Search Capacity 
Economic sociologist David Stark has observed that “search is the 
watchword of the information age.”168  We are now so reliant on in-
formation technology in daily life that it can be hard to remember 
how complex and costly tasks were before its diffusion.169  Consider, 
for instance, the location and purchasing of a book.  The 1990s were a 
decent time to find a specialized, old, or out-of-print work if you had 
access to a large university library.170  If not, the search could be quite 
laborious.171  Scarcely two decades later, this market has been revolu-
tionized.172  Sites like Amazon not only offer low prices and rapid 
shipping for most volumes, but they also provide something of a plat-
                                                        
 167.  See e.g., Gerard F. Anderson et. al., Health Care Spending and Use of Information Tech-
nology in OECD Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 819, 821 (2006) (proposing the adoption of 
health IT as a method of controlling health spending). 
 168.  DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
1 (2009). “With a few keywords at the toolbar, we can access enormous databases to find 
an obscure article by a long-distant colleague, identify the supplier of a critical component, 
read about the benefits and side effects of new pharmaceutical products or medical pro-
cedures, or find the fact that immediately settles a dispute about the performance of an 
opera, an athlete, or a mutual fund.” Id.   
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Robert P. Holley & Kalyani Ankem, The Effect of the Internet on the Out-of-Print Book 
Market: Implications for Libraries, 29 LIBR. COLLECTIONS, ACQUISITIONS, & TECHNICAL SERVS. 
118, 119 (2005), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
S1464905505000278 (arguing that before the 2000s, libraries were the primary source of 
out-of-print books, whereas the Internet has increased the efficiency of the out-of-print 
book market, thereby increasing availability and access). 
 171.  For one account of search methods, see Douglas Duchin & Celia Scher Wagner, 
Trials and Tribulations: Out-of-Print 101, 20 LIBR. ACQUISITIONS: PRAC. & THEORY 341, 342–
43 (1996), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0364640896000 
506; see also Mary Eldredge, Comparison of Out-of-Print Searching Methods, 17 LIBR. 
ACQUISITIONS: PRAC. & THEORY 427, 432 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com 
/science/article/pii/036464089390006R. 
 172.  See supra note 170; see also Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kin-
dles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 149 (2009) (discussing how Ama-
zon Kindle is revolutionizing the way we buy and read books). 
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form for their own competitors—for example, used booksellers and 
other retailers.173  These sellers compete not only on price but also on 
quality, occasionally demanding a few more dollars for a book in “ex-
cellent” (as opposed to “used”) condition.174  The competitive pres-
sures are enormous, bringing a range of volumes within reach of con-
sumers who would otherwise be extremely inconvenienced to find 
them.175 
Just as Amazon has revolutionized the publishing industry, Apple 
has remade the world of online music by designing simple interfaces 
and providing instant access to products.176  A little over a decade ago, 
digital music was mired in conflicts over rights, balky technology, and 
annoying digital rights management.177  Now Apple’s iPod, iTunes, 
iPhone, and iPad have combined to unleash an ecosystem of innova-
tion.178  The power of a well-maintained and popular platform is 
enormous.  As Amar Bhide has argued, “innovations that sustain 
modern prosperity have a variety of forms and are developed and 
used through a massively multiplayer, multilevel, and multiperiod 
                                                        
 173.  Frequently, the biggest competition is Amazon itself.  See Richard Russo, Amazon’s 
Jungle Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A35 (discussing Amazon’s price-check app which 
allows shoppers in physical book stores to scan a bar code and see if they can get a better 
price online through Amazon). 
 174.  Fred Bernstein, Unloading His Books, but Not His Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2002, at G5 (describing how the price of a resold book on Amazon is dependent on its 
condition). 
 175.  Barry Lynn and Steven Pearlstein present more skeptical views.  Barry C. Lynn, 
Killing the Competition: How the New Monopolies Are Destroying Open Markets, HARPER’S BAZAAR, 
Feb. 1, 2012, at 27 (illustrating how monopolistic capitalism is destroying various markets); 
Steven Pearlstein, Pick Your Monopoly: Apple or Amazon, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2012, at G1 
(“So which is better: a market in which Amazon uses low prices to maintain its e-book mo-
nopoly and drive brick-and-mortar bookstores out of business, or one in which the major 
book publishers, in tacit collusion with Apple, break Amazon’s monopoly and raise pric-
es?”).   
 176.  Randy Lewis, Steve Jobs Revolutionized the Music Industry, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/06/entertainment/la-et-jobs-music-20111007; 
Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kimberlee Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust 
Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 460 
(2002) (describing in detail the state of the digital music industry as of 2002). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  John Markoff, Steven P. Jobs 1955–2011; Redefined the Digital Age as the Visionary of 
Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, at A1. 
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game.”179  Pervasive search capacity allows the players to find one an-
other and cooperate over time.180 
Labor can also be the object of search capacity.  Analyzing task-
matching programs like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, LiveOps, and 
TxtEagle, Jonathan Zittrain has observed that “[w]e are in the initial 
stages of distributed human computing that can be directed at mental 
tasks the way that surplus remote server rackspace or Web hosting can 
be purchased to accommodate sudden spikes in Internet traf-
fic . . . .”181  The resulting distributed labor force offers unparalleled 
flexibility for enterprises.  Zittrain presents a compelling account of 
how the day-to-day phenomenology of labor, supervision, and moni-
toring can be technologically transformed via computing capacity.182 
2.  Predictive Analytics and Personalization 
Massive stores of data can also be used to tailor offerings to cus-
tomers.  One data broker alone, Acxiom, has at least 1,600 pieces of 
information about ninety-eight percent of U.S. citizens, quietly gath-
ered from thousands of sources.183  Driven by marketing opportuni-
ties, intermediaries track and record nearly all online activity.  Sec-
ondary uses of data are ubiquitous.  Marketers can easily repurpose 
the data, assessing whose behavioral profiles match those of tax evad-
ers, insurance cheats, or terrorists. Private companies are also joining 
the “data-driven” bandwagon, digitizing reputation assessment sys-
tems. 
Privy to an ever expanding store of transactions, credit card 
companies are at the vanguard of predictive analytics.  Credit card 
                                                        
 179.  AMAR BHIDE, THE VENTURESOME ECONOMY: HOW INNOVATION SUSTAINS 
PROSPERITY IN A MORE CONNECTED WORLD 9 (2008). 
 180.  A prescient legal academic recognition of the need for such capacity in health 
care was the discussion of “common exchange representation” by Hoffman and Podgurski.  
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of 
Electronic Health Records, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 153 (2008). 
 181.  Jonathan Zittrain, Ubiquitous Human Computing, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: 
MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL, & ENG’G SCI. 3813, 3813–21 (2008).  Zittrain’s work on privica-
tion was a prescient response to privacy dilemmas raised later in this Article. 
 182.  Frank Pasquale, Banana Republic.com, CYBERLAW JOTWELL (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://cyber.jotwell.com/2011/01/. 
 183.  See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE (2011); DAN SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION (2008). 
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purchase records are a data geek’s dream.184  Quantitative analysts 
correlate various forms of behavior to uncover hidden relationships.185  
Billing data may identify buying patterns that associate with profitable 
customers.  One company determined that buyers of cheap automo-
tive oil were worse risks than those who paid for a brand-name oil.186  
Drinking beer at a sketchy bar, installing chrome-skull car accessories, 
or subscribing to Soldier of Fortune magazine might lead to higher in-
terest rates or lower credit limits.187  One researcher has bragged that 
his firm considers over 300 characteristics to pinpoint delinquency 
risks.188 
In a 2006 Businessweek cover story, Stephen Baker described the 
spread of quantitative analysis in leading industries.189  “Partnerships 
between mathematicians and computer scientists are pulling into 
whole new domains of business and imposing the efficiencies of 
math,” he reported.190 Over the next several years, Baker focused on 
the extensive implementation of tracking and analysis at IBM.191  Ian 
Ayres has also hailed the role of “supercrunchers” in promoting more 
efficient business practices.192 
                                                        
 184.  Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., May 12, 2009, at 40. (“Just a little more than two decades ago, the credit-card busi-
ness was a quiet, slightly boring industry dominated by banks looking for easy revenue.  
Card issuers made money by collecting annual dues and interest payments from cardhold-
ers as well as fees from merchants each time a customer used a card.  Then the math whiz-
zes arrived.”). 
 185.  SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES 
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 31, 45 (2010) (discussing data 
crunching). 
 186.  Duhigg, supra note 184, at 40 (“[P]eople who bought cheap, generic automotive 
oil were much more likely to miss a credit-card payment than someone who got the expen-
sive, name-brand stuff.”). 
 187.  Id.; see also Frank Pasquale, Online Health Data in Employers’ and Insurers’ Predictive 
Analytics, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://www.concurring 
opinions.com/archives/2010/11/online-health-data-in-employers-and-insurers-predictive-
analytics.html (“Many have complained about inaccuracy in these new forms of profiling, 
and consumers’ inability to review and correct digital dossiers collected about them.”). 
 188.  Pasquale, supra note 187. 
 189.  Stephen Baker, Math Will Rock Your World, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 22, 
2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-01-22/math-will-rock-your-world. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  STEPHEN BAKER, THE NUMERATI 20–40 (2009). 
 192.  IAN AYRES, SUPERCRUNCHERS 16 (2007). 
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3.  Customers Promote Innovation via Co-Creation of Value 
A thriving information economy does not just need innovative 
firms.  It also crucially depends on active consumers, people willing to 
take the time to learn how to use a new product and to broaden its 
range of uses.193  Sometimes called “prosumers” (producing consum-
ers) or “playborers” (those whose play generates the value usually as-
sociated with labor), early adopters and proselytizers of new technol-
ogies can catalyze a chain reaction of networked product and service 
use.194  Think back to the first time you used an MP3 player-—the de-
vice needed to be connected to your computer and its software in-
stalled, sometimes with instructions only found in online “manuals” 
created by other users.  The seamless interface design of Apple and its 
best applications (“apps”) have not always helped the digital consum-
er find his way.  Rather, persistent profits could only be built on a 
base of largely unpaid labor by enthusiastic early users.195 
The spectacular growth of apps within Apple’s hardware is one of 
today’s economy’s greatest success stories.196  When someone like 
Marco Arment develops a useful app like Instapaper, he does not 
merely make at least a few hundred thousand dollars for himself; he 
also draws in first-time users to explore and learn about how other 
                                                        
 193.  Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing the im-
portance of peer production within and outside marketized social relations). 
 194.  TYLER COWEN, CREATE YOUR OWN ECONOMY: THE PATH TO PROSPERITY IN A 
DISORDERED WORLD 158 (2009) (“America has created a very special environment for nur-
turing the creativity of diverse talents.”).  But see generally TREBOR SCHOLZ & LAURA LIU, 
FROM MOBILE PLAYGROUNDS TO SWEATSHOP CITY (2012), http://www.situated 
technologies.net/files/ST7-MobilePlaygrounds_SweatshopCity.pdf (examining how 
“communication, attention, and physical movement generate financial value for a small 
number of private stakeholders”). 
 195.  In The Venturesome Economy, Amar Bhide has described the traits of consumers that 
lead to such cooperative and iterative innovation.  BHIDE, supra note 179, at 27.  Examin-
ing the “technostructure” behind over 100 innovative businesses, Bhide has observed that 
“[a] new ‘diskless’ (or ‘thin client’) computer, for instance, will generate revenue for its 
producer and value for its users only if it is effectively marketed by the former and proper-
ly deployed by the latter,” and that “Microsoft profited enormously from pioneers’ efforts 
to educate customers and create a market for spreadsheets.”  Id. at 8, 17. 
 196.  Mobile health is one of the fastest growing areas in medicine.  Elizabeth 
Dougherty, Mobilizing a Revolution: How Cell Phones are Transforming Public Health, HARV. 
PUB. HEALTH REV., Winter 2012, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/ 
magazine/mobilizing-a-revolution/. 
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software could make their lives easier.197  Kevin Kelly has suggested 
that the “technium,” an assemblage of connected, smart, motivated 
users, can improve outcomes in unexpected ways.198  Communities 
and companies are already coalescing around health data openness 
initiatives.199 
B.  Search and Analytics for the Health Information Technology of 
Quality Assessment 
There are at least two major barriers to the optimal use of search 
and analytics in health care.  First, powerful incumbent firms can use 
secrecy to frustrate efforts to understand the true value of their ser-
vices.200  As noted above, a pharmaceutical company may reduce or 
deny access to data;201 an insurer may offer hundreds of slightly differ-
ent plans to make informed shopping impossible; even health IT 
companies themselves may use licensing agreements that forbid dis-
closure of defects in their software.202  Second, the privacy concerns of 
                                                        
 197.  See Farhad Manjoo, IPhone Apps to Organize Your Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at B5 
(discussing “the best apps to keep your life running smoothly”). 
 198.  KEVIN KELLY, WHAT TECHNOLOGY WANTS 14 (2011). 
 199.  See, for example, the Department of Health and Human Services’ management of 
the Community Health Data Initiative (“CHDI”).  Community Health Data Initiative, 
HHS.GOV/OPEN, http://www.hhs.gov/open/plan/opengovernmentplan/initiatives/ 
initiative.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013) (“Since the debut of our initial Open Govern-
ment Plan, the public-private Community Health Data Initiative collaboration has already 
attracted companies, nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, and innovators of all 
stripes to utilize the data HHS is providing and develop applications for the public.”); Pro-
ceedings, HHS NCVHS, June 17, 2010 (unedited transcript), http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
100617tr.htm (“What the folks at Asthmopolis have done is to put little tiny GPS trackers 
on inhalers for asthma patients.  What they are doing is both enabling providers to track 
what is happening to their asthma patients, but through crowd sourcing they are able to 
identify regions in parts of cities where the air is bad on a particular day, because they are 
picking up a whole lot of inhaler use in a particular part of a city on a particular day.”). 
 200.  See Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 235, 239–43 (2011) [hereinafter Pasquale, Restoring Transparency] (arguing 
that industry secrecy obfuscates critical data failing to reveal the true costs of health care). 
 201.  See Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 35. 
 202.  Jonathon H. Roth, Regulating Your Medical History Without Regulations: A Private 
Regulatory Framework to Electronic Health Record Adoption, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2103, 2124–25 
(2011). 
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patients have slowed adoption of some digital records.203  Moreover, 
where privacy concerns have been ignored (as in the rapid dissemina-
tion of pharmacy dossiers), they have led to unfair, invasive, and ir-
remediable violations of the privacy of the individual.204 
Key parts of the PPACA of 2010 and the ARRA of 2009 reduce 
barriers to health IT deployment related to secrecy prerogatives and 
privacy and security concerns.205  The PPACA’s insurance regulations 
promote transparency; its quality improvement mechanisms are de-
signed to make providers more easily comparable; and its Patient-
Centered Outcomes and Research Institute (“PCORI”) and Inde-
pendent Payment Advisory Board (“IPAB”) are calculated efforts to 
                                                        
 203.  See generally Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of Health 
Care Privacy, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 680, 685 (2004).  Patient concerns are not hypothetical; 
data breaches have been on the rise.  Reported Health Data Breaches Rose by 97% in 2011, 
IHEALTHBEAT (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2012/2/1/health-data-
breaches-increased-by-97-in-2011-report-finds.aspx; Scott Gibson, Stolen Medical Records One 
of the Most Lucrative Forms of ID Theft, HEALTHCARETECHREVIEW (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://healthcaretechreview.com/stolen-medical-records-lucrative/. 
 204.  Over twenty-one million patients have suffered data security breaches reported to 
the federal government over the past three years.  See section 13402(e)(4) of the HITECH 
Act, in HEALTH INFO. SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BREACHES AFFECTING 
500 PATIENTS OR MORE, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ 
administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).  Even 
non-breached data can lead to serious negative consequences. See, e.g., Chad Terhune, 
They Know What’s in Your Medicine Cabinet, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 22, 2008), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm (“Two-
thirds of all health insurers are using prescription data—not only to deny coverage to indi-
viduals and families but also to charge some customers higher premiums or exclude cer-
tain medical conditions from policies, according to agents and others in the industry.”); 
Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 
MD. L. REV. 140, 162 (2006) (“Without consent, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS) mined its cus-
tomer prescription records for the purpose of sending its customers mailings targeted to 
their specific medical conditions . . . .”).  There are also legitimate worries about discrimi-
natory uses of information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination laws, 
or undetectable by workers.  Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic 
Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (raising the pos-
sibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based on EHRs to determine 
which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers”). 
 205.  See Ariele Yaffee, Financing the Pulp to Digital Phenomenon, 7 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 325, 340–41 (2011) (discussing the privacy regulations of HITECH under 
ARRA and the privacy provisions in PPACA). 
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generate objective information about drugs and devices free of the 
conflicts of interest and shadowy pecuniary ties that render suspect so 
much sponsored research.206  The ARRA tries to protect patients from 
misuse of their medical data by requiring the use of “audit trails” to 
record each instance of access to a record and creating incentives for 
the use of encryption and other best practices.207 
These statutory provisions are now being implemented in an epic 
series of rulemakings.  As they continue, predictable counterattacks 
have been launched by affected industries.  This Article focuses on 
two lines of attack as particularly worth addressing.  First, all the pro-
viders mentioned above have insisted that complexity in their fields 
can never truly be grasped by regulators or rendered clear to con-
                                                        
 206.  Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1955, 1990–91 (2011) (noting that a key goal of PPACA’s exchanges is “to facilitate 
easy plan comparison, to maximize transparency, and to boost competition”); Scott 
Lindstrom, Health Care Reform and Rural America: The Effect of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act on the Rural Economy and Rural Health, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 645 (2011) 
(“PPACA calls for the creation of state health insurance . . . [that] will provide information 
to potential insurance enrollees about the costs and benefits of various plans and provide 
ratings based on relative quality and price to allow comparison of individual and small 
group health insurance options.”); Lance Gable, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Public Health, and the Elusive Target of Human Rights, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 340, 351 
(2011) (“The IPAB recommendations for best practices and cost-effective treatments also 
could have a positive impact on quality.”). 
 207.  Sandra Nunn, Managing Audit Trails, 80 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. 44, 44 (2009) (“Audit 
trails are records with retention requirements.”); John W. Hill et al., A Proposed NHIN Archi-
tecture, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 503, 517 (2011) (“HITECH expanded the reach of HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule.  Patients must now be notified when their PHI is disclosed or used without their au-
thorization. HITECH closed the loophole for business associates, established patients’ 
right to access and control of their PHI (including obtaining an audit trail showing all 
electronic disclosures), and prohibited companies from selling PHI without authoriza-
tion.”).  The audit trail is a sine qua non for technological due process.  Danielle Keats Cit-
ron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305–06 (2008) (exploring the 
due process implications of automated system determinations and arguing that technolog-
ical due process requires the inclusion of audit trails into automated systems).  Neverthe-
less, even this mechanism of protection must be carefully implemented so that the audit 
process itself does not create its own potential for breaches.  See, e.g., Dom Nicastro, HIPAA 
Auditor Involved in Own Data Breach, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/PHY-269480/HIPAA-Auditor-Involved-in-
Own-Data-Breach (reporting that a firm hired to conduct audits lost an unencrypted flash 
drive with 4,500 patient records). 
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sumers.208  Second, they have accused HHS of engaging in stealth in-
dustrial policy, picking winners and losers in the health care field by 
effectively outlawing certain business models and promoting others.209 
As HHS considers comments on the emerging information law of 
health reform, it should focus on moving from transparency to intelligi-
bility in industry data.  Rather than merely opening up the black box 
of presently maintained information, policymakers need to focus on 
developing the types of data entry standards and contractor-based 
analysis that can make that data actionable. 
In 2010, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (“PCAST”) warned against health information technolo-
gy adoption that is uninspired by a vision for data use and sharing 
that would allow health care to enjoy the quality and efficiency gains 
characteristic of information industries.210  Unfortunately, the EHR 
industry’s rejection of the PCAST approach has stifled debate here.211  
The next Sections make a case for reviving PCAST’s (and others’) 
ambitious goals for health IT systems, based on the successes of IT in 
other parts of the economy.  Effective health information technology 
depends on sophisticated surveillance: watching, recording, and ana-
lyzing patients, populations, and providers.212 
C.  Monitoring Quality in Accountable Care Organizations 
The history of American health care is littered with cost-
reduction ideas that ran into the buzz saw of quality concerns, provid-
er resistance, or patient rebellion.213  While capitation promised to in-
centivize cost discipline, the many health maintenance organizations 
                                                        
 208.  See infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See infra Part IV. 
 210.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE 
HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf. 
 211.  Terry, Anticipating, supra note 111, at 111–12. 
 212.  See Kenneth W. Goodman, Ethics, Information Technology, and Public Health: New 
Challenges for the Clinician-Patient Relationship, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 58 (2010) (arguing 
that surveillance is necessary to ensuring useful health information is not ignored). 
 213.  See, e.g., GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2010) (examining the conflict-
ed history of American health care); Frank Pasquale, The Hippocratic Math: How Much 
Should Society Spend on Health Care?, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 529 (2012) (reviewing Gregg Bloche’s 
book, The Hippocratic Myth (2010), and critiquing some cost reduction efforts). 
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(“HMOs”) charged with implementing the concept faced a backlash 
in the 1990s as they attempted to implement aggressive utilization re-
view.214  More recently, the less controversial ideas behind gainsharing 
ran into a number of legal obstacles.215 
The PPACA has emphasized Accountable Care Organizations 
(“ACOs”) as a relatively ambitious form of cost cutting.216  Implement-
ed as part of a Medicare shared savings program,217 ACOs are net-
                                                        
 214.  Thomas H. Greaney, Managed Care: From Hero to Goat, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 217 
(2003) (examining managed care in the 1990s); Joe White, Markets and Medical Care: The 
United States, 1993–2005, 85 MILBANK Q. 395, 426 (2007) (“Utilization reductions were part 
of the reason that cost increases slowed in the mid-1990s.  Group/staff HMOs certainly did 
reduce hospitalization rates . . . .  Moreover, health insurers did retreat from many of the 
methods of utilization controls that they had emphasized in the mid-1990s.” (citations 
omitted)).   
 215.  Gainsharing is a financial arrangement that permits physicians to share in the sav-
ings that result when they alter practice patterns.  Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: 
Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
145, 147 (2003).  For example, a group of surgeons may engage in bulk purchasing to ob-
tain discounts on surgical equipment, rather than each choosing instruments individually.  
Start-ups like Groupon and Living Social have exploited this savings model, but residual 
quality concerns have impeded its adoption in health care settings.  Some recent pilot 
programs have indicated the potential for savings from gainsharing.  Mike Kalison, Presen-
tation at the Seton Hall Law Symposium on ACOs (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 216.  PPACA § 3022(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 395 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)); 
Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations in the Affordable Care Act, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1371, 1371 (“The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) . . . depends on Ac-
countable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate care for large groups of Medicare 
beneficiaries and reduce their overall costs while maintaining quality.”). 
 217.  PPACA § 3022(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 395 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)).  
The term ACO originated in a 2006 exchange.  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable 
Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w56 n.7 (2007), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.  It is designed to solve a classic 
“chicken and egg” problem in health care reform: whether to start with payment or deliv-
ery system reform.  See KELLY DEVERS AND ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN INST., CAN 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE THE VALUE OF HEALTH CARE BY SOLVING 
THE COST AND QUALITY QUANDARIES? (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploaded 
pdf/411975_acountable_care_orgs.pdf (“Many believe that to bend the cost curve while 
improving quality, we must reform the provider payment system first, because it pays for 
volume rather than value.  Others hold that it is impossible to change the payment system 
to achieve the desired objectives unless delivery system reform first produces organizations 
capable of handling an altered payment system.  To avoid the quandary of where to start 
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works of providers and hospitals218 that are charged with coordinating 
care for a group of at least 5000 Medicare beneficiaries.219  As of early 
2012, HHS had already named thirty-two “health care organizations 
and providers that are already experienced in coordinating care for 
patients across care settings” as pioneer ACOs.220  ACOs can be physi-
cian-centered, hospital-centered, or some combination of the two.221  
CMS will reward the provision of quality care by giving providers par-
ticipating in the ACO a share of the savings if risk-adjusted, per-
beneficiary spending levels come in below a benchmark set by the 
agency at the outset.222  For example, if benchmark spending was 
                                                        
first—provider payment or delivery system reform—the ACO concept attempts to combine 
them.”); Sarah Klein, Building Accountable Care Organizations that Improve Quality and Lower 
Costs—A View from the Field, COMMONWEALTH FUND NEWSLETTER, June/July 2010, available 
at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Quality-Matters/2010/June-
July-2010/In-Focus.aspx. 
 218.  Bruce Merlin Fried et al., Accountable Care Organizations: Navigating the Legal Land-
scape of Shared Savings and Coordinated Care, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 88 (2010) (“A wide 
range of professionals may work together to establish ACOs, including physicians in group 
practice arrangements, networks of individual physician practices, hospitals, and partner-
ships or joint ventures between hospitals and physician groups.  [Accountable Care Organ-
izations] also may include other forms of groups as the HHS Secretary (Secretary) deems 
appropriate.  By forming an ACO, these healthcare providers commit to being held ac-
countable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries.”). 
 219.  Peter Fise, Prognosis for Synergy Between Accountable Care Organizations and Bundled 
Payments in Medicare, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 296, 297 (2012) (“Under Con-
gress’ vision for ACOs, the program will encourage providers to establish new health care 
entities that coordinate care for an assigned group of at least 5,000 Medicare beneficiar-
ies . . . .”).  ACOs have also been called “amorphous cluster[s] of possible collaborative 
models,” where hospitals are bound to remain central because “the largest avoidable Med-
icare costs are hospital related” and “in many communities, the hospital is the only orga-
nized care delivery entity capable of executing the model.”  Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable 
Care Organizations: The Case For Flexible Partnerships Between Health Plans And Providers, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 32, 33 (2011).  
 220.  Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovations. 
cms.gov/initiatives/aco/pioneer/ (last visited July 12, 2012). 
 221.  Physician-centered ACOs could include multispecialty group practices (“MSGs”) 
and interdependent physician organizations (“IPOs”), also known as independent practice 
associations (“IPAs”). Wasif Ali Khan, Accountable Care Organizations: A Response to Critical 
Voices, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 320–23 (2012). 
 222.  See generally RTI INT’L, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION 2012 PROGRAM 
ANALYSIS 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
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$10,000 apiece for 10,000 beneficiaries in 2014, and the ACO reduced 
the spending to $9,000 while maintaining quality levels, $10 million in 
savings could be attained, some of which would compensate partici-
pants in the ACO for cutting costs while maintaining or improving 
quality. 
Elliott Fisher, director of the Center for Health Policy Research 
at Dartmouth Medical School, has described the “three key attributes” 
of ACOs: “organized care, performance measurement, and payment 
reform.”223  Fisher has argued that insurers are not well-positioned to 
improve the quality of health care because they “have largely focused 
on negotiating favorable prices within relatively open networks of 
providers” instead of trying to improve the health care their members 
received.224  He believes that a “virtual organization” of physicians 
could do a better job if they teamed up with hospitals.225  ACO refers 
to this legal alliance, which would be entitled to receive payments in 
exchange for cutting costs or improving quality.226 
In an ACO, an “extended hospital medical staff” (or “a hospital-
associated multispecialty group practice”) can join forces with a hospi-
                                                        
payment/sharedsavingsprogram/downloads/aco_qualitymeasures.pdf (describing the 
shared savings program); see also Jackson Williams, The “Shared Accountability” Approach to 
Physician Payment: Four Options for Developing Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 185 (2010) (describing the fee-for-service approach for Accountable Care Organi-
zations). 
 223.  Craig Schneider, A Primer on Accountable Care Organizations, MASS. MED. SOC’Y, 
http://www.massmed.org/Content/NavigationMenu2/ContinuingEducationEvents/New
Courses/AccountableCareOrganizations101APrimer/Introduction/introduction.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2012) (citing Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: 
The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44 (2007)). 
 224.  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital 
Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w45 (2007).  Private insurers have little incentive to 
keep current subscribers healthy over the long term, since at least half of subscribers on 
average churn into different plans within three years of signing up with a given plan.  See 
Randall D. Cebul et al., Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare 
System, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93, 97 (2008) (arguing that shortening the insurer-policy 
holder relationship will lead to fewer investments in future health). 
 225.  See Fisher et al., supra note 224, at w45. 
 226.  See, e.g., Jackson Williams, The “Shared Accountability” Approach to Physician Payment: 
Four Options for Developing Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 186 
(2010) (arguing that shared accountability occurs by “grouping doctors and hospitals to-
gether into discrete payment pools, through which collective performance could be re-
warded as a unit”). 
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tal and agree to be compensated via a lump sum payment.227  If the 
group manages to keep overall costs beneath the lump sum payment, 
it can share the gains among its members.  Each part of the team also 
has an incentive to work together to keep those they care for 
healthy.228  In an ideal world, the ACO responds to the concerns 
about fragmentation, as discussed by several health law experts.229 
Nonetheless, there are skeptics.  Jeff Goldsmith has worried 
about shadowy new pressures on providers that patients will not be 
aware of: 
Consumers would not be aware that they were being treated 
by ACOs.  Rather, they would be “attributed” to them: virtual 
patients of virtual organizations.  Aggregate health spending 
for attributed patients would be tracked, and increases in 
that spending would be capped using a form of “shadow cap-
itation.”  ACOs that lived within the caps would get their fees 
increased. Those that overspent would see their fees re-
duced or frozen.230 
Gail Wilensky believes that hospitals may dominate ACOs: “[I]f 
[hospitals] are the only entities receiving the payment, [there] will 
[be] a bad imbalance between groups of physicians and the hospi-
tals.”231  Robert Pear has also reported that a potential “frenzy of mer-
gers involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs 
                                                        
 227.  Khan, supra note 221, at 317 (“An ACO under the Extended Medical Staff model 
would essentially be a hospital-associated, multispecialty group practice that is empirically 
defined by direct or indirect referral patterns to a hospital.”). 
 228.  Williams, supra note 226. 
 229.  See THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 230.  Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care Organization: Not Ready for Prime Time, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/08/17/the-accountable-
care-organization-not-ready-for-prime-time/; see also Craig Evan Pollack & Katarina Arm-
strong, Accountable Care Organizations and Health Care Disparities, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1706, 1707 (2011) (expressing concern that ACOs will avoid high-need areas); Jessica 
Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1393, 1405 (2012) (adducing evidence to demonstrate that it is sometimes 
very difficult to disincentivize unnecessary care without also discouraging needed interven-
tions).   
 231.  Perspective Roundtable: Creating Accountable Care Organizations, NEW ENG. J. MED. 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1009040 (transcript down-
load available). 
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and savings” worries consumer advocates and antitrust scholars.232  
“The new law is already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures 
and alliances in the health care industry,” as antitrust expert Thomas 
Greaney has noted.233  He has stated: “The risk that dominant provid-
ers and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individu-
ally or jointly, has never been greater.”234 
ACOs also implicate fraud and abuse laws, since anti-kickback 
statutes and other prohibitions can hamstring efforts to create rele-
vant financial incentives.235  At a recent government workshop on 
ACOs, participants addressed “circumstances under which collabora-
tion among independent health care providers in an ACO permits 
ACO providers to engage in joint price negotiations with private pay-
ers without running the risk of engaging in illegal price fixing under 
the antitrust laws.”236  HHS also explored “the different ways in which 
                                                        
 232.  Robert Pear, As Health Law Spurs Mergers, Risks Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, 
at A1 (“In an environment where health care providers are financially rewarded for keep-
ing costs down,” [a lawyer for the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities] said, “anyone 
who has a disability or a chronic condition, anyone who requires specialized or complex 
care, needs to worry about getting access to appropriate technology, medical devices and 
rehabilitation.  You don’t want to save money on the backs of people with disabilities and 
chronic conditions.”); Tara Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations to 
Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON  HALL  L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2012) (discussing potential 
antitrust issues in an article primarily aimed at addressing them). 
 233.  Pear, supra note 232; see also Thomas Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competi-
tion Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 843–44 (2011); Cory Capps & David 
Dranove, Market Concentration of Hospitals, BATES WHITE (June 2011), available at 
http://www.ahipcoverage. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-Consolidation-
Final.pdf (illustrating recent merger trends in the health care field). 
 234.  Pear, supra note 232. There have been some recent wins for federal enforcers 
against certain major mergers, but the overall record of the past two decades has been one 
of consolidation.  See, e.g., Joe White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 
85 MILBANK Q. 143 (2007) (“Hospital managers consolidated systems in order to strength-
en their bargaining power with insurers, and studies show that consolidation did indeed 
enable hospitals to extract higher-than-average price increases.”). 
 235.  Khan, supra note 221, at 326 (“Besides antitrust concerns, ACOs raise signifi-
cant . . . fraud and abuse concerns.”). 
 236.  Agenda, Workshop Regarding Accountable Care Organizations, and Implications 
Regarding Antitrust, Physician Self-Referral, Anti-Kickback, and Civil Monetary Penalty 
(“CMP”) Laws (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-
for-Service-Payment/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/100510_Meeting_Agenda.pdf. 
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the Secretary may exercise waiver authority or create new exceptions 
and safe-harbors related to the physician self-referral law, the Anti-
kickback statute and the CMP law in order to encourage the creation 
and development of ACOs.”237  The American Medical Association 
(“AMA”) has pushed for “explicit exceptions to the antitrust laws” for 
participating doctors.238  And, as Pear has reported, the president of 
the Federation of American Hospitals believes that “‘the fraud and 
abuse laws should be waived altogether.’”239 
Some scholars may share that skeptical view of fraud and abuse 
laws, at least as those laws pertain to the types of economic transac-
tions necessary to make ACOs work.240  Over the past twenty years, 
regulation of fraud and abuse has waxed and waned.241  In 1996, 
James F. Blumstein concluded that “the modern American healthcare 
industry is akin to a speakeasy—conduct that is illegal is rampant and 
countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law is so out 
of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the market-
place.”242  Nevertheless, as Joan Krause has shown, there are important 
public purposes behind these laws, and it is troubling to see a hospital 
leader advocating for them to be swept away tout court, as in the case 
of ACOs.243  Policymakers should also be cautious about granting over-
ly broad antitrust exemptions to ACOs in a field where competition 
law’s prerogatives have already been whittled away.244 
                                                        
 237.  Id. 
 238.  AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TALKING POINTS: CMS OPEN 
DOOR FORUM ON ACOS (2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/ 
mm/399/talking-points-acos.pdf. 
 239.  Pear, supra note 232. 
 240.  See, e.g., Khan, supra note 221, at 337–40 (noting that “ACO waivers are a signifi-
cant departure from the requirements of existing fraud and abuse laws”). 
 241.  See, e.g., V. Michel Magloire Marcoux, Why Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Laws Should 
Allow Appropriate Hospital Gainsharing, 59 ALA. L. REV. 539, 540 (2008) (“Departing from its 
previously distrustful view of hospital gainsharing agreements, OIG issued an Advisory 
Opinion in January 2005 promising not to impose sanctions for violations of healthcare 
fraud and abuse statutes on a hospital’s gainsharing program . . . .”). 
 242.  James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Market-
place: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 218 (1996). 
 243.  Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 243 (2004). 
 244.  Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices, AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PLANS COVERAGE (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/fact-check-
provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/.  An alternative is to give up on health care anti-
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Legal scholar Kevin Werbach has observed that the Internet is 
centripetal, “pull[ing] itself together as a coherent whole.”245  For 
Werbach, network formation theory explains these centripetal 
tendencies and some of “the pressures threatening to pull the Inter-
net apart” into balkanized units.246  Werbach has counseled that gov-
ernments need to “catalyz[e] network formation, and moderat[e] the 
forces that push towards excessive concentration of power.”247  These 
recommendations should also govern new efforts to create “virtual 
networks” of care in the wake of PPACA.  Like many forms of network 
power, the ACOs could quickly have negative unintended conse-
quences if regulators fail to anticipate the ways they could be 
abused.248  ACOs may work, but only if policymakers can replace clas-
sic instruments of health care regulation with calibrated financing de-
cisions that reflect new industry realities.249  Health information tech-
nology will be vital to this transition.250 
                                                        
trust as a largely failed project, and to start regulating dominant ACOs as veritable health 
care utilities, as critical to regional infrastructure as roads, electricity, or water.  See Frank 
Pasquale, The Limits of Competition, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 26, 2009), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/10/the-limits-of-competition-and-
the-rebirth-of-the-public-option.html (suggesting that antitrust exemptions may be respon-
sible for certain insurer failures).  The logic of concentration seems inevitable in the field: 
Insurers and providers have long been in an arms race for bargaining power, and as soon 
as one side gets permission to merge or acquire, the other clamors for it.  Id. 
 245.  Kevin D. Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and 
the Forces Tearing it Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 343 (2009). 
 246.  Id. at 345. 
 247.  Id. at 346, 410. 
 248.  See Frank Pasquale, Network Power: Forced and Free, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 27, 
2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/05/network_power_f.html 
(analogizing the success at Google to network effects and government intervention that 
created network power for telephone and cable companies). 
 249.  See Peter Fise, Prognosis for Synergy Between Accountable Care Organizations and Bundled 
Payments in Medicare, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 296, 322–23 (2012) (concluding 
that programs must be implemented with flexible regulations). 
 250.  Amy K. Fehn, The Importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care Or-
ganizations, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (June 2, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_1106_aco_ 
fehn.html/ (“The proposed rules for Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) participat-
ing in Medicare Shared Savings Program . . . highlights the important role health infor-
mation technology will play . . . .”). 
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In the older instances of capitation and gainsharing, critics wor-
ried that providers would be incentivized to cut costs by skimping on 
care.251  The ACO concept attempts to avoid this problem by fully pre-
serving fee for service payments under Medicare’s Diagnosis Related 
Group System (for hospitals) and the Resource Based Relative Value 
Scale System (for physicians).252  It also conditions the distribution of 
any gains on maintenance of a certain baseline of quality.253  In the 
notice of proposed rulemaking on ACOs in early 2011, HHS an-
nounced sixty-five quality indicators that ACOs would need to re-
port.254  After a blizzard of critical comments, the agency backed down 
in the final rule, only requiring thirty-three measures.255 
Since care coordination is a large part of the value proposition of 
ACOs, they can be counted on to deploy advanced health information 
technology.256  Moreover, the mandated flexibility of the ACO concept 
will require nimble systems that allow patients to move in and out of 
                                                        
 251.  See, e.g., William H. Thompson, Aligning Hospital and Physician Incentives in the Era of 
Pay-for-Performance, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 327, 341 (2006) (“By their nature, gainsharing 
programs are focused almost entirely on cost-savings, not quality or efficiencies; although 
cost, quality and efficiencies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.”). 
 252.  Jackson Williams, The “Shared Accountability” Approach to Physician Payment: Four Op-
tions for Developing Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 190 (2010) 
(“The ACO is seen as having the potential to harness some of the positive characteristics of 
managed care—such as . . . the infrastructure of an integrated delivery system—without 
the negative characteristics . . . because it remains a fee-for-service system, retaining inde-
pendent proprietorships, and any financial incentives to stint on care can be counterbal-
anced, or outweighed, by incentives to improve patient outcomes.”). 
 253.  See RTI INT’L, supra note 222, at 1 (“[I]f an ACO meets quality standards and 
achieves savings and also meets or exceeds a Minimum Savings Rate (MSR), the ACO will 
share in savings, based on the quality score of the ACO.”). 
 254.  76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,571–19,591 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
 255.  76 Fed. Reg. 67, 802, 67,889–67,890 (Nov. 2, 2011). The thirty-three measures in-
cluded one based on data provided to CMS and ONC-HIT as part of the HITECH incen-
tive programs for Health IT adoption; seven focused on patient/caregiver experiences, to 
be reported by conducting patient surveys; three focused on care coordination, to be re-
ported by using medical claims; and several at-risk population measures (for those with 
diabetes, heart disease, and some other conditions) to be reported under a group practice 
reporting option system.  Id. 
 256.  Terry, Anticipating, supra note 111, at 110 (“[A]s laboratories for future healthcare 
models, ACOs are expected to innovate through their adoption of HIT [“Health Infor-
mation Technology]”).   
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particular ACOs.257  This health IT should also prove valuable in 
building a quality case for individual ACOs claiming shared savings, 
and for ACOs as a delivery system of reform generally.258 
Consultants are already advising on “what IT underpinnings will 
be necessary” for accountable care models.259  At a Healthcare Infor-
mation and Management Systems Society conference, Dave Garets, an 
executive director at the Advisory Board Company, discussed how 
ACOs would need IT upgrades for network interconnectivity, clinical 
knowledge management, patient participation, financial operations, 
and population risk management.260  Patients may start with simple 
email access to scheduling, then “graduate” to full PHRs and passive 
monitoring of health status.261  Clinical knowledge management can 
evolve from EHRs to structured clinical documentation and predictive 
analytics.262  Network interconnectivity could plug the ACO into larger 
health information exchanges designed to monitor regional popula-
tions.263 
Though implementation may be technical and complex, sophis-
ticated informatics can promote uncontroversial goals.264  For exam-
                                                        
 257.  See id. at 108 (“As originally conceptualized ACOs would require. . . robust HIT 
systems in order to integrate the data flow between the participants and to provide out-
comes reporting.”). 
 258.  Id. at 109. 
 259.  Jennifer Prestigiacomo, IT Blueprints for ACOs, HEALTH CARE INFORMATICS (Feb. 
20, 2012), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/it-blueprint-acos; see also Terry, 
Anticipating, supra note 111, at 108 (“HIT requirements and synchronization with MU 
[meaningful use] pervaded the ACO proposed regulation.”). 
 260.  See Mike Milliard, Garets Is Sanguine About IT Future—with Caveats, HEALTHCARE IT 
NEWS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/print/11946 (discussing confer-
ence and Garets’ comments). 
 261.  Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 
1 DREXEL L. REV. 216, 220 (2009). 
 262.  See e.g., SHARON SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, USING 
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS TO IMPROVE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
LEADING HOSPITALS 4, 17 (2012) (noting that EHRs are increasingly being used by hospi-
tals for clinical documentation and predictive analytics). 
 263.  Id. at 21, 32–33 (concluding that hospitals should use EHRs for regional data ex-
changes for sharing data with other hospitals). 
 264.  Daniel Marino, Translating Accountable Care Goals into IT Action, HEALTHCARE 
INFORMATICS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/translating-
accountable-care-goals-it-action (“The push for accountable care has created a new vocab-
ulary for healthcare leaders: clinical integration, longitudinal records, ambulatory net-
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ple, a “clinical data repository (also called a patient disease regis-
try) . . . allows an organization to report off clinical data, which is 
needed for calculating actual clinical quality outcomes and compar-
ing them against industry benchmarks.”265 
D.  Data-Driven Drug and Device Optimization 
There are serious deficiencies in America’s system of pharma-
covigilance—namely “the science and activities relating to the detec-
tion, assessment, understanding and prevention of adverse effects or 
any other drug-related problem.”266  This Section reviews leading re-
form proposals and explains how some of the tactics and methods de-
veloped by leading information industries could be applied to the as-
sessment of drugs and devices.267 
Digitized health data should enable extraordinary new possibili-
ties for medical research.268  Observational research (based on actual 
patients’ experience with drugs and procedures) may turn out to be 
more useful than clinical trials once a critical mass of outcomes has 
been recorded and researchers can control for environmental and 
other variations.269  Legal scholars have examined the trade-offs be-
tween data portability, standardization, privacy, and innovation in 
EHRs.270  One key to policy success in the EHR field will be distin-
                                                        
works, patient registries, care protocols, and more.  Many hospital CIOs are uncertain how 
to piece it all together, and they are having trouble pinning down the IT requirements for 
making accountable care a reality.”). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE IMPORTANCE OF PHARMACOVIGILANCE 7 (2002), availa-
ble at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf. 
 267.  See infra Part III.D. 
 268.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE 
HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf 
(describing potential improvements in care). 
 269.  Id. at 66–67. 
 270.  See Greg R. Vetter, Slouching Toward Open Innovation: Free and Open Source Software 
for Electronic Health Information, 30 WASH. U. J.L & POL’Y 179, 179–86 (2009) (arguing that 
“contemporary FOSS [free and open source software]” approaches to open innovation 
may not necessarily fit every software market [for electronic health information]” and ex-
amining the issues with FOSS in a “business-to-business software market within health care 
where the U.S. government recently has supported efforts to promote a FOSS product”); 
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guishing between raw data (which should be both portable and, when 
properly anonymized, subject to academic research)271 and its inter-
pretation and organization (which are more justifiably considered in-
tellectual property of a particular firm).272  Vendors of EHR software 
can exploit a combination of trade secrecy law and licensing agree-
ments to help providers “lock up” data in proprietary formats.273  If 
any particular entity retains excessive control over data, many im-
portant forms of research may be unduly limited.274  Scientists also 
worry about a trend toward obscurity in the computational modeling 
of medical interventions.275 
                                                        
Barbara Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 70–77 (2011) 
(arguing that the “debate should be about appropriate public uses of private data and how 
best to facilitate these uses while adequately protecting individuals’ interests”); Marc Rod-
win, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 586, 586–89 
(2010) (noting that the way in which “the law defines ownership of patient data will shape 
whether its benefits can be developed and also affects patient confidentiality” and arguing 
that “treating patient data as private property precludes forming comprehensive databases 
required for many of its most important public health and safety uses”). 
 271.  Marc A. Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
86, 88 (2009).  For a good discussion of laws about anonymization procedures, see Barbara 
Evans, Ethical and Privacy Issues in Pharmacogenomic Research, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: 
APPLICATIONS TO PATIENT CARE (Howard L. McLeod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
 272.  For the benefits of such data analysis, see David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A 
Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 16 (2005); Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the Inferen-
tial Gap: The Electronic Health Record and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. w181, w181–82 
(2007). 
 273.  Pasquale, Restoring Transparency, supra note 200. 
 274.  See Longman, supra note 131, at 23 (alleging that “billions of taxpayers’ dollars are 
about to be poured into expensive, inadequate proprietary software, thanks to a provision 
in the stimulus package”). There are indications that the agencies may be responding to 
concerns like those expressed by Longman. See, e.g., Jordan T. Cohen, CMS and HHS Re-
lease New Proposed Rules Governing Health IT—Part 1: Overview of Proposed Rule on “Meaningful 
Use,” HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/ 
01/03/cms-and-hhs-release-new-proposed-rules-governing-health-it-%E2%80%93-part-1-
overview-of-proposed-rule-on-%E2%80%9Cmeaningful-use%E2%80%9D/. 
 275.  Jennifer Kahn, Modeling Human Drug Trials—Without the Humans, WIRED, Dec. 
2009, at 156, 157, 194 (“In early 2004 . . . the American Diabetes Association asked a physi-
cian and mathematician named David Eddy to run his own . . . trial [on atorvastatin].  He 
would do it, though, without human test subjects, instead using a computer model he had 
designed called Archimedes.  The program was a kind of SimHealth: a vast compendium 
of medical knowledge drawn from epidemiological data, clinical trials, and physician in-
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Efthimios Parasidis’s article, Patients over Politics, is among the 
leading legal academic proposals for reform of systems of pharma-
covigilance.276  Parasidis begins by focusing on popular misconcep-
tions about the role of the FDA and the scope of its powers.277  Many 
consumers assume that the FDA has carte blanche authority and am-
ple funding to detect adverse effects from drugs once they are mar-
keted.278  Parasidis shows, however, that even after the Vioxx scandal, 
an Institute of Medicine report recommending a vast increase in its 
powers, and the passage of the Food & Drug Administration Amend-
ments Act of 2007, the FDA still lacks the “resources to compel, moni-
tor, and review post-market research” adequately.279  Parasidis exam-
ines in detail the long history of FDA underfunding and the more 
recent political dynamics that help ensure that this underfunding will 
continue to be the case.280 He convincingly argues that post-approval 
surveillance will only reach its full potential if a wider array of stake-
holders begins to take advantage of the emerging health data infra-
structure to critically evaluate the effects of various treatments.281 
If the free flow of data can be elevated to constitutional status to 
run roughshod over privacy concerns (as in the case of Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc.282), perhaps it may eventually improve pharmacovigilance 
by trumping trade secrecy laws.283  Pharmaceutical firms have some-
                                                        
terviews, which Eddy had laboriously translated into differential equations over the past 
decade. . . .  Eddy’s secretive habits are . . . troubling, according to David Nathan, director 
of the Diabetes Center at Massachusetts General Hospital.  ‘If you listen to David, he has 
10,000 variables and differential equations describing everything from blood sugar to of-
fice furniture . . . .  But it’s never quite clear what they are or how they interact.  All the 
calculations happen inside a black box.  And that’s a problem because there’s no way to 
tell whether the model’s underlying assumptions are right.’”).  
 276.  Parasidis, supra note 40, at 929, 977 (proposing “reform measures that mitigate 
risk-enhancing aspects of the regulatory framework for medical products”). 
 277.  Id. at 931. 
 278.  Id. at 931–32. 
 279.  Id. at 931.  By proposing integration of post-market drug surveillance into an ex-
tant health IT infrastructure, Parasidis tries to sidestep bitter political battles about the 
funding of new FDA initiatives.  Id. at 984–85. 
 280.  Id. at 936–60. 
 281.  Id. at 970–74. 
 282.  131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 283.  Id. at 2670–72 (ruling that drug companies have a constitutional right to access 
certain types of data without undue state interference).  For a critical description of the 
stakes of Sorrell, see David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ 
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times continued to market drugs even after reports emerge that un-
dermine the rationale for taking the drug, let alone paying for it.284  If 
Parasidis’s policy proposals are enacted, they will seriously undercut 
that troubling method of attaining short-term profits at the cost of 
long-term sustainable business models.285 
Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski have detailed how such 
advanced programs of research on effectiveness could work.286  Their 
proposal for new forms of personalized medicine takes to the individ-
ual level what Parasidis envisions for population-wide analysis: 
We propose the development of a broadly accessible frame-
work to enable physicians to rapidly perform, through a 
computerized service, medically sound personalized com-
parisons of the effectiveness of possible treatments for pa-
tients’ conditions.  A personalized comparison of treatment 
effectiveness . . . for a given patient (the subject patient) 
would be based on data from EHRs of a cohort of patients 
who are similar to the subject patient (clinically, demo-
graphically, genetically), who received the treatments previ-
ously and whose outcomes were recorded.287 
According to Hoffman and Podgurski, such a database query 
could identify “for a given patient, an appropriate reference group 
(cohort) of similar, previously treated patients whose EHRs would be 
                                                        
Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 81  (2010) (“When people develop relationships with 
their physicians and pharmacists, they are entitled to the assurance that information about 
their medical condition will be used for their benefit and not to place their health at risk 
or to increase their health care costs.”); Frank Pasquale, Privacy as a First Amendment Value, 
HEALTH CARE BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2011/04/29/ 
rethinking-ims-health-v-sorrell-privacy-as-a-first-amendment-value/. 
 284.  See Pasquale, Restoring Transparency, supra note 200, at 240 (recognizing that 
“[p]harmaceutical companies also push to keep exclusive access to their own data—even 
when serious public health concerns arise about their products”). 
 285.  See Parasidis, supra note 40, at 934 (explaining that until systems of post-market 
surveillance are far more sophisticated, tort law will play a critical role in establishing a 
baseline of evidence to measure the true costs and benefits of drugs).  Unfortunately, as 
Parasidis documents, “[f]ederal statutes grant broad immunities to vaccine and medical 
device sponsors, and generic drug sponsors are immune from all state law failure-to-warn 
claims.”  Id.  This makes responsive regulation all the more essential. 
 286.  Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through Personalized Compari-
sons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 
425 (2011) [hereinafter Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes]. 
 287.  Id. 
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analyzed to choose the optimal treatment for the patient at issue.”288  
Their proposal is a logical extension of an idea promoted in an Insti-
tute of Medicine report known as the “Wilensky Proposal,” which 
called for more targeted comparative effectiveness research.289  Re-
search has already demonstrated that pharmacogenetic algorithms 
can outperform algorithms that consider only clinical factors.290 
The PCAST also endorsed aggressive use of health data to ensure 
new research opportunities.291  The PCAST authors concluded that 
many clinical research studies today are “out of date before they are 
even finished,” “burdensome and costly,” and too narrowly focused.292  
They endorsed health information technology that is enabled for 
“syndromic surveillance,” “public health monitoring,” and “adverse 
event monitoring” by aggregating observational data.293 
Of course, there are challenges to this type of research.  Systems 
must move beyond mere transparency to data entry standards that al-
low for the intelligibility required by personalized medicine.294  As 
Hoffman and Podgurski recognize, “the need to code all presenting 
comorbidities” and to identify “patients who have the specific condi-
tion to be studied” is crucial to data quality.295  There is a tension be-
tween untrammeled innovation by vendors at any given time and lat-
er, predictable needs of patients, doctors, insurers, and hospitals to 
compare their records and to transport information from one filing 
system to another.296 
                                                        
 288.  Id. at 426. 
 289.  See INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 52 
(2007) (addressing comparative effectiveness). 
 290.  J. Woodcock and L. J. Lesko, Pharmacogenetics—Tailoring Treatment for the Outliers, 
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 811, 811 (2009). 
 291.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 268, at 64 (rec-
ommending use of “large datasets” to address numerous issues in clinical research). 
 292.  Id. at 63. 
 293.  Id. at 64. 
 294.  See Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes, supra note 286, at 429 
(explaining the benefits of personalized comparisons of treatment effectiveness (PCTEs), 
a form of personalized medicine, that uses information obtained through a large database 
search to “find a cohort for a patient needing treatment”). 
 295.  Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes, supra note 286, at 433. 
 296.  Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding A Cure: The Case for Regulation and 
Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 103, 151 (2008)  [hereinaf-
ter Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding A Cure] (describing the tension and recommending 
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For example, one system may be able to understand “C,” “cgh,” 
or “koff” as “cough,” and may well code it in any way it chooses.297  But 
to integrate and to port data, all systems need to be able to translate 
symptoms, diagnoses, interventions, and outcomes into commonly 
recognized coding.298  Competition also depends on data portability: 
Health care providers can only credibly threaten to move their busi-
ness away from an unsatisfactory vendor if they can transport those 
records.299  Patients want their providers to seamlessly integrate rec-
ords.300  Stage II of meaningful use regulation can promote a common 
language of medical recordkeeping.301 As Hoffman and Podgurski 
recommended in 2008: 
[I]t is necessary for all vendors to support what we will call a 
“common exchange representation” (“CER”) for EHRs.  A 
CER is an artificial language for representing the infor-
mation in EHRs, which has well defined syntax and seman-
tics and is capable of unambiguously representing the in-
formation in any EHR from a typical EHR system. EHRs 
using the CER should be readily transmittable between EHR 
systems of different vendors.  The CER should make it easy 
for vendors of EHR systems to implement a mechanism for 
translating accurately and efficiently between the CER and 
the system’s internal EHR format.302 
                                                        
regulations that “require EHR system vendors and health care providers to make reasona-
ble efforts to identify and employ best practices relating to all of the following: hazard and 
risk analysis and mitigation; software development, validation, and maintenance; security 
measures; and system integration and operation”). 
 297.  Id.  at 152 (noting that “medical terminology is complex, variable, and evolving”). 
 298.  Id. at 153 (promoting a “common exchange representation” (CER), an artificial 
language that represents information). 
 299.  Niva Elkin-Koren, User-Generated Platforms, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 111, 121–22 (Rochelle C. Dreyfus, Harry First & Diane L. 
Zimmerman eds., 2010) (describing the importance of data portability). 
 300.  David Lagesse, Deloitte: Patients Want Electronic Health Records, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT (Mar. 4, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/daves-
download/2008/03/04/deloitte-patients-want-electronic-health-records_print.html (not-
ing that a survey by the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions reported that “3 of 4 consum-
ers want their doctors to provide online access to an integrated medical record and that 1 
in 4 would pay more for the service”). 
 301.  Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure, supra note 286, at 151–53 (citing the diffi-
culties that medical terminology presents in EHR system record keeping). 
 302.  Id. at 153. 
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There are also important opportunities for standardization in the 
security field.303  The discussion can quickly become technical, but the 
underlying purpose is clear: to develop some standard forms of inter-
acting in a realm where “spontaneous order” is unlikely to arise, and 
where network effects (as well as what David Grewal describes as net-
work power) could lead to the lock-in of suboptimal patterns of data 
storage and transfer.304 
Parasidis also describes how the development of health IT infra-
structures in the United States can enable forms of surveillance that 
are more rigorous, comprehensive, and actionable in the world of 
policy and more user-friendly for patients.305  As he observes, “EHR 
systems now permit advanced data-entry options such as ‘free text 
[entry], templated data entry, dictation, speech recognition, and 
freehand graphic input.’”306  Rather than getting between doctor and 
patient, advanced EHR stands poised to silently monitor and improve 
their relationship.307  The same record systems that are designed to 
digitize health diagnoses and interventions can also generate out-
come data if they are configured appropriately.  Such data would help 
ensure that patients and authorities are truly informed about the risks 
and benefits of drugs.308  A complete record of “demographics, pro-
gress notes, vital signs, medical history, immunization history, and la-
boratory and radiological reports” can contribute greatly to “evidence-
                                                        
 303.  Id. at 156 (“As is true for a common exchange format, standardized security poli-
cies and mechanisms are unlikely to be adopted by vendors and providers without a regu-
latory mandate.  In order to facilitate compliance and provide vendors with clear guid-
ance, the regulatory mandate might incorporate, by explicit reference, some established 
and emerging security standards, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force’s Transport 
Layer Security (“TLS”) standard or its Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) standard.”).   
 304.  DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 21–
22 (2009) (advancing an argument that “focus[es] on the power that standards have in 
bringing in to being new global networks”).  One of the greatest challenges for health care 
providers as they adopt this type of technology is balancing proprietary interests in innova-
tive data entry options and modes of representation with the public need for interopera-
bility and portability of data.  Id. at 23.  The second two stages of “meaningful use” re-
quirements established by HHS will need to balance these two goals.  Id.  Standards play a 
crucial role in networks—they determine how people and entities are connected.  Id. 
 305.  Parasidis, supra note 40, at 966–67. 
 306.  Id. at 965.  
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 967–68. 
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based decision support, quality management, and health-outcomes 
reporting at both the individual and population levels.”309 
In the realm of health IT, Parasidis, Terry, Hoffman, and 
Podgurski are among the first legal academics to convincingly merge 
literatures of health system transformation, practical implementation, 
and legal guidance.  They suggest that the practical feasibility of trans-
forming healthcare generally, and post-market pharmaceutical sur-
veillance in particular, into an information industry with the types of 
productivity gains we usually associate only with Silicon Valley.310  As 
Parasidis notes of the FDA’s deployment of “Mini-Sentinel:” 
Rather than creating a centralized database, Mini-Sentinel 
uses a distributed data network that is linked by a coordinat-
ing center.  The Mini-Sentinel data network incorporates 
EHRs from diverse data sets that are maintained by public 
and private stakeholders.  Each data partner retains control 
over its own patient-level data and permits others to access 
its aggregated and de-identified medical data.311 
Just as the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and Na-
tional Security Agency (“NSA”) have advanced domestic intelligence 
capabilities by querying distributed databases from diverse public and 
private sector partners, the FDA can now apply such technology to-
ward improving population health.312  As the next Part shows, creative 
partnerships with private sector contractors can build institutional ca-
pacity to promote public health. 
                                                        
 309.  Id. at 964. 
 310.  See Parasidis, supra note 40, at 984–86 (proposing integration of post-market drug 
surveillance into an extant health IT infrastructure); Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving 
Health Care Outcomes, supra note 286, at 425 (proposing the development of a “broadly ac-
cessible framework” that enables doctors to quickly perform comparisons of treatments); 
Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure, supra note 296, at 151 (recommending regulations 
that require doctors to use IT to improve practices).  
 311.  Parasidis, supra note 40, at 971. 
 312.  For an account of the DHS approach, see Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasqua-
le, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1449 
(2011) (discussing the close ties of private entities to state and federal “fusion centers,” 
which collect and share information and intelligence). 
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IV.  WATCHING THE WATCHERS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
PROPRIETARY DATA 
Comparing homeland security and health surveillance may strike 
some readers as either facile or menacing.  To be sure, the quest for 
intelligibility described above has some resonance with the concept of 
“legibility” explored and critiqued in works like James A. Scott’s Seeing 
Like a State.313  We can all imagine troubling misuses of data.314  But 
there are important differences between the models of data collection 
and analysis proposed by entities like PCAST and the clumsier, more 
manipulative models of population management criticized in the sur-
veillance studies literature.315 
First, medical researchers have already developed elaborate 
methods of de-identifying and protecting data in research settings.316  
Scholars like Parasidis. Hoffman, and Podgurski propose an extension 
of the research enterprise into the vast stores of data that will be ena-
bled by advanced health information technology.317  In the case of in-
cidental findings, Susan Wolf has already identified a fading boundary 
between research and treatment, which might occasion an interven-
tion in the midst of an experimental inquiry devoted to entirely dif-
ferent aims.318  If carefully applied to the realm of personalized com-
parisons of treatment effectiveness and comparative effectiveness 
                                                        
 313.  See generally JAMES A. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO 
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998) (critiquing “schematic visions” that 
fail to respect local knowledge and variation).  
 314.  Several laws address such misuses.  See, e.g., Breach Notification for Unsecured 
Protected Health Information Interim Final Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2011); FTC Health Da-
ta Breach Notification Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 318 (2012). 
 315.  THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER 13 (Sean P. Hier & Josh Greenberg eds., 
2007) (surveying critiques of panoptic, cryptopic, and other forms of oppressive monitor-
ing). 
 316.  Properly deployed, de-identification can protect patients’ privacy while enabling 
research.  See Evans, supra note 271 (describing “several important categories of tissue 
specimens and health data commonly used in pharmacogenetic research (for example, 
anonymized, coded, and identified tissue specimens and health data)” and distinguishing 
“privacy authorization requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule from informed consent requirements”).   
 317.  See supra Part III.D. 
 318.  See generally, Susan M. Wolf, Incidental Findings in Neuroscience Research: A Fundamen-
tal Challenge to the Structure of Bioethics and Health Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara Sahakian eds., 2011). 
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research, researchers’ extant standards of anonymization and de-
identification could allay many privacy concerns.319  Combined with 
audit trails, which document access to records, and real penalties for 
breaches, these practices could promote a health data infrastructure 
that addresses concerns about misuse of data.320 
Second, both HHS and DOJ have developed an extraordinary 
apparatus for combating fraud and abuse.321  The public-private sur-
veillance partnerships pioneered in their fraud-fighting efforts are a 
model for both the first-order problem of collecting and analyzing da-
ta and the second-order problem of “watching the watchers” to ensure 
that data is used properly.322  Having honed these techniques in the 
context of law enforcement to protect the public purse, HHS now 
needs to turn them to assuring the integrity and effectiveness of a de-
veloping health information network.323  The first step will be another 
“grand bargain” for big data: more access to patient records in ex-
change for greater accountability for their use.324 
A.  Privacy, De-Identification, and Research 
Two of the most important issues affecting health technology 
policy are transparency and access.  Regulators must decide whether 
to permit innovators to control data flows to give them incentives, and 
where such control must end to respect broader social concerns 
about privacy.325  Individuals justly are concerned that data or speci-
mens related to them can be used in ways that compromise future 
opportunities.  As William Pewen has noted, “Americans’ support for 
the use of their [EHRs]—even to facilitate treatment and payment—is 
limited; 78 percent supported giving physicians access to their EHR, 
while only 30 percent favored health plan access.”326  Research data 
                                                        
 319.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 320.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 321.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 322.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 323.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 324.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 325.  See Pasquale, Restoring Transparency, supra note 200, at 242–43 (discussing the pri-
vacy concerns of patients and secrecy protections of companies). 
 326.  William Pewen, Breach Notice: The Struggle for Medical Records Security Continues 
(“[P]atients have been outraged to receive solicitations for purchases ranging from drugs 
to burial plots, while at the same time receiving care which is too often uncoordinated and 
unsafe.  It is no wonder that many Americans take a circumspect view of health IT.”). 
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may be even more sensitive than entries about a patient’s existing 
conditions and complaints, since it can include direct and incidental 
findings whose implications have not been fully considered and ex-
plored by the patient.327 
These concerns are reflected in health privacy law.  Entities cov-
ered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”) are restricted in their uses of health information in 
many settings.328  Compliance professionals must navigate a complex 
legal landscape as they conduct medical research.329  The Federal Pol-
icy for the Protection of Human Subjects (the “Common Rule”), the 
FDA framework of human-subject protections, HIPAA, and related 
regulations create many obligations.330  Breach notification laws en-
courage encryption.331  As Barbara Evans has noted, “[t]he Federal 
regulations allow individual states to impose additional, higher priva-
cy and human-subject protections on research that is within each 
state’s jurisdiction,” creating another layer of complexity in the com-
pliance process.332  State laws requiring affirmative consent can upend 
the expectations of researchers who have meticulously complied with 
federal rules and guidelines.333 
One way to reassure patients that their data will not be misused is 
to reduce or encrypt the linkage between data and its source.334  Vari-
ous legal regimes have created a complex set of terminologies for in-
                                                        
 327.  See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Re-
search: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 241 (2008) (noting that an 
incidental finding may reveal sensitive data the person may not want shared). 
 328.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2011). 
 329.  See Regulations, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (highlighting federal regulations). 
 330.  CARL COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS (2005). 
 331.  They encourage, but do not require, encryption, by reducing penalties for the loss 
of encrypted data.  Harley Geiger, HHS Should Require the Encryption of Portable Devices to 
Curb Health Data Breaches, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 16, 2011), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/hhs-should-require-encryption-portable-devices-
curb-health-data-breaches. 
 332.  Evans, supra note 271, at 330.  
 333.  Id. at 331. 
 334.  Geiger, supra note 331. 
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dicating how well-linked given data is to its source.335  Evans’s account 
of the “networked” nature of pharmacogenomic discovery would help 
health IT policymakers grasp the potential of information flows, and 
understand how unharmonized legal requirements can impede inno-
vation.336  The National Bioethics Advisory Commission, the Interna-
tional Conference on Harmonization, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
have created diverse and sometimes overlapping categories of infor-
mation.337  A thriving research sector must have some mechanisms in 
place for monitoring and controlling data flows.338 
Evans does not propose a sweeping solution to the problems 
raised by complex and conflicting data flow rules.339  Limits on access 
and reuse reflect valid concerns: As endless stories of breaches and 
new data uses proliferate, data subjects need more robust assurances 
about controlled data dissemination.340  Evans also powerfully cri-
tiques the opacity and possible conflicts of interests in the Institution-
al Review Boards (“IRBs”) and Privacy Boards that make many critical 
decisions about data and specimen flow.341  Her work suggests that 
whatever rules govern the emerging infrastructure of health data sur-
                                                        
 335.  See Joseph Conn, Data Encryption Just One Option Under Security Law, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (May 12, 2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20090512/NEWS/305129979 (explaining some of the different levels of encryption in 
HIPAA, such as de-identified records compared to records with limited data sets). 
 336.  Evans, supra note 271, at 325. 
 337.  Id.  For example, there are three distinctive levels of information linkage recog-
nized by HIPAA. See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA 
PRIVACY RULE 1, 3–4 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/ 
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (explaining what information is protected 
by HIPAA). 
 338.  ALLAN FRIEDMAN & DAVID LAZAR, KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T, INFORMATION SHARING 
AND PRIVACY WITH PERSONAL MEDICAL RECORDS 1 (2006), available at 
http://allan.friedmans.org/papers/medical-records-mitre.pdf (explaining the importance 
of controlling patient data flow). 
 339.  Evans, supra note 271, at 325–28. 
 340.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 9–10 (2009–
2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breach 
notificationrule/breachrept.pdf. 
 341.  Evans, supra note 271, at 328. 
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veillance, they will need to be complemented by monitoring that 
seeks to detect and deter inappropriate uses of information.342 
If patients are to fully “buy in” to digitization of health records 
(and the full array of opportunities for use of them), they will need to 
be able to understand exactly how their digital records exist (and are 
used) in an increasingly complex virtual landscape.  Patients need to 
engage in the “right to receive an accounting of disclosures of pro-
tected health information made by a covered entity in the six years 
prior to the date on which the accounting is requested,” and to have 
the information in formats that allow their own trusted interpreters to 
make sense of it.343  Before HITECH, the HIPAA Privacy Rule limited 
patients’ ability to understand the nature and range of disclosures of 
their records because disclosures for “treatment, payment and health 
care operations” did not need to be accounted for.344  After HITECH, 
such disclosures need to be in accountings of electronic records.345 
Technical standards can play a crucial role in securing network 
accountability.  In a notice of proposed rulemaking, HHS recognized 
that “use of audit trails and the right to an accounting of disclosures 
improves the detection of breaches and assists with the identification 
of weaknesses in privacy and security practices.”346  Audit logs record 
                                                        
 342.  See generally Evans, supra note 271, at 313–38 (discussing the concerns and solu-
tions regarding data flow). 
 343.  45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2011). 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  Before HITECH, 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 restricted the right to an accounting of dis-
closures by exempting disclosures that were “[t]o carry out treatment, payment and health 
care operations.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(i) (2009).  HITECH removed that exception.  
42 U.S.C. § 17935(c) (West 2010) (“In applying section 164.528 of title 45, Code of Feder-
al Regulations, in the case that a covered entity uses or maintains an electronic health rec-
ord with respect to protected health information . . . the exception under paragraph 
(a)(1)(i) of such section shall not apply to disclosures through an electronic health record 
made by such entity of such information . . . .”). 
 346.  HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures under the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 31,426, 31,427 (proposed 
May 31, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) [hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule], 
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/05/31/2011-13297/hipaa-
privacy-rule-accounting-of-disclosures-under-the-health-information-technology-for-
economic#p-34; see also 45 C.F.R. § 170.302 (2011) (“[R]ecord actions related to electronic 
health information in accordance with the standard specified in § 170.210(b) [and] 
[g]enerate audit log [by] [e]nabl[ing] a user to generate an audit log for a specific time 
period and to sort entries in the audit log according to any of the elements specified in the 
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the activity taking place in an information-sharing network,347 includ-
ing “queries made by users, the information accessed, information 
flows between systems, and date- and time-markers for those activi-
ties.”348  If audit logs are immutable and pervasively attributable, they 
should seriously deter misuse of data.349 
Some industry comments on the rulemaking vigorously opposed 
aggressive implementation of consumer rights.350  Nevertheless, in the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule released in January 2013, HHS confirmed the 
                                                        
standard at 170.210(b).”); Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Im-
plementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record 
Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,591 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170)) (re-
quiring that certified EHR technology have the following capabilities “to, at a minimum, 
support eligible professionals’ and eligible hospitals’ efforts to achieve what had been pro-
posed for meaningful use Stage 1 under the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Pro-
grams proposed rule”); 45 C.F.R. § 170.210 (2011) (explaining “[t]he date, time, patient 
identification, and user identification must be recorded when electronic health infor-
mation is created, modified, accessed or deleted; and an indication of which action(s) oc-
curred and by whom must also be recorded”). 
 347. 28 C.F.R. § 23 (2012) (discussing criminal intelligence systems operating policies). 
 348.  MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, MARKLE FOUND., 
IMPLEMENTING A TRUSTED INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: USING IMMUTABLE 
AUDIT LOGS TO INCREASE SECURITY, TRUST, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2006).  The Markle 
Foundation has worked on several important reports on deploying cutting edge IT in 
agencies, including HHS.  Id. at 4. 
 349.  For a discussion of the importance of immutable audit logs, see Pasquale and Cit-
ron, supra note 312, at 1473 (explaining that “ [i]mmutable audit logs [promote] data in-
tegrity and relevance. [by] watermark[ing data] with its provenance, assuring attributions 
and verifiability of observations (much as citations help assure the validity of an assertion 
in an academic work)[and promoting] tethering and full attribution of data to allow cor-
rections to propagate through the system” (internal citations omitted)).  
 350.  MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, LLP, OCR’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO ACCOUNTING 
FOR DISCLOSURES STANDARD PRODUCES STRONG OPPOSITION FROM MANY COVERED 
ENTITIES, 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp1011b.pdf; Jennifer 
L. Edlind, HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures (RIN 0991-AB62); Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 31426 (May 31, 2011), Aug. 1, 2011, at 1 (responding 
to request for comment on HIPAA Privacy Rule and Accounting of Disclosures in capacity 
as University Hospital Privacy Officer); Larry Davis, Attention: HIPAA Privacy Rule Ac-
counting of Disclosures (RIN 0991-AB62); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 
31426 (May 31, 2011), July 21, 2011, at 3 (responding to request for comment on HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and Accounting of Disclosures in capacity as St. Bernards Healthcare Corpo-
rate Compliance Officer). 
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importance of promoting patients’ access to their records.  According 
to this final rule, covered entities must provide individuals “with ac-
cess to the protected health information in the form and format re-
quested by the individual, if it is readily producible in such form and 
format.”351  In any twelve-month period, the first accounting requested 
by an individual from a covered entity must be provided for free, with-
in sixty days of the request (with some narrow exceptions).352 
Expanding access to personal information is part of a larger 
movement to hold corporate actors accountable in an era of rapidly 
declining data storage costs.353  Asked about privacy practices, 
Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt once said, “[w]e like to get right 
up to the creepy line, but not cross it.”354  But it would probably be 
more accurate to say that he and other corporate leaders do not want 
to be caught crossing the creepy line.  Law and technology provide a 
rich variety of tactics to avoid that possibility.355  Accountings of disclo-
                                                        
 351.  Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notifica-
tion Rules under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5,566 (Jan. 25, 
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160, 164) (expanding individuals’ rights to access 
protected health information).  Such accountings must include: 
(i) The date of the disclosure; (ii) The name of the entity or person who re-
ceived the protected health information and, if known, the address of such entity 
or person; (iii) A brief description of the protected health information disclosed; 
and (iv) A brief statement of the purpose of the disclosure that reasonably in-
forms the individual of the basis for the disclosure or, in lieu of such statement, a 
copy of a written request for a disclosure under §§ 164.502(a)(2)(ii) or 164.512, 
if any. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.528(b)(2). 
 352.  45 C.F.R. § 164.528(c)(2) (“The covered entity must provide the first accounting 
to an individual in any 12 month period without charge.  The covered entity may impose a 
reasonable, cost-based fee for each subsequent request for an accounting by the same in-
dividual within the 12 month period, provided that the covered entity informs the individ-
ual in advance of the fee and provides the individual with an opportunity to withdraw or 
modify the request for a subsequent accounting in order to avoid or reduce the fee.”).   
 353.  Pasquale, Restoring Transparency, supra note 200, at 237–39. 
 354.  Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists,’ ATLANTIC 
ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:58 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/ 
10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-written-by-lobbyists/63908/. 
 355.  Pasquale, Restoring Transparency, supra note 200, at 235–39. 
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sures should provide a persistent record of data use that should deter 
at least some privacy violations.356 
B.  Public-Private Surveillance Partnerships 
Fortunately, technologically sophisticated models for persistent 
monitoring of health care enterprises have developed over the past 
decade.357  Private and public payers have developed elaborate meth-
ods of deterring overbilling.358  Though private insurers’ methods are 
largely proprietary, public programs like Medicaid and Medicare have 
released details about their sources, tactics, and methods.359  HHS has 
also demonstrated a heartening track record of learning from failed 
enforcement methods and trying new approaches.360  Its public-private 
partnerships in the fraud area could prove a model of modulated and 
responsive regulation in response to expanded opportunities for 
abuse in the realm of health data.361 
The U.S. government has been improving its surveillance capa-
bilities and developing templates for public-private partnerships in 
monitoring and analyzing large quantities of data.362  DHS and CMS 
have implemented ambitious methods of gathering intelligence to al-
low early detection and deterrence of troubling patterns.363  For ex-
ample, DOJ and HHS greatly increased fraud and abuse recoveries by 
more aggressively deploying data mining technology.364  By contract-
ing with expert companies, public authorities leveraged corporate ex-
pertise for public purposes.365 
Fraud may be the most grotesque example of wasted health care 
expenditure.  Fortunately, fraud recovery efforts are illuminating the 
way toward a more comprehensive system of monitoring health care 
professionals, patients, and support providers.366  Those who follow 
                                                        
 356.  See HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 346 (pointing out that audit trails “discourage 
inappropriate behavior”). 
 357.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 358.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 359.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 360.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 361.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 362.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 363.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 364.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 365.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 366.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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health care fraud and abuse know that data mining in that field has 
improved enforcement practices in ways that are helpful to agencies 
and even potential defendants, who are encouraged to develop more 
efficient business processes to avoid audits.367  Moreover, even in a 
health policy landscape that is often riven by partisan divisions, the 
utilization of health information technology to combat fraud and 
abuse has been a top priority of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations.368  After describing the problems with fraud and 
abuse enforcement of the 1980s and 1990s,369 this Section explains the 
role of technology and public-private partnerships in detecting and 
punishing problematic provider behavior.370 
1.  Rocky Beginnings for Fraud & Abuse Enforcement 
Fraud and abuse have long been a scourge of the U.S. health 
care system.371  Stories abound of diluted medications, unlicensed 
providers, cosmetic surgery misrepresented as ‘medically necessary,’ 
and kickbacks designed to bilk CMS.372  Congress has passed several 
laws to bar certain transactions and to impose serious penalties for 
abusive practices.373  It has also empowered agencies to enforce old 
statutes with renewed vigor.374  Enforcers heavily rely on civil false 
                                                        
 367.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 368.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 369.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 370.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 371.  See infra Part IV.B.1; MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: HOW FRAUD 
BLEEDS AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 40 (2000); Leemore Dafny and David Dranove, 
Regulatory Extrapolation and Management Changes: Upcoding in the Hospital Industry, 52 J.L. & 
ECON. 223 (2009); Daniel R. Levinson, A New Era of Medicare Oversight, 15 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y, 249, 252 (2012) (describing the history and inadequacies of a pay-and-chase 
model). 
 372.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC: 2010–
2011, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-
2010-2011. 
 373.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006) (addressing health care fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 24 
(2006) (providing definitions relating to federal health care offense); Medicare-Medicaid 
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142 (1977). 
 374.  For example, the False Claims Act had been on the books for over a century to 
deter those who would cheat the government by billing it for unnecessary services.  The 
Civil False Claims Act prohibits the knowing filing of a false or fraudulent claim for pay-
ment to the United States, and the knowing use of a false record or statement material to 
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claims actions to stop fraud and abuse by providers who rely on pay-
ments from government-funded insurance programs.375  Congress also 
passed a number of more specific laws that directly address the pro-
priety of particular transactions; for example, whether a doctor could 
refer a patient to an imaging center or hospital in which the doctor 
held an ownership interest.376  Entire health law courses focus on the 
prohibitions, safe harbors, and related legal guidances arising out of 
laws like Stark I and II and the Anti-Kickback Statute.377 
Unfortunately, the statutes are so complex and multifaceted that 
it is difficult for many providers to understand where aggressive busi-
ness practices end and illegal acts begin.  By the mid-1990s, Professor 
James Blumstein concluded that the medical marketplace had begun 
to resemble Prohibition-era bars, where authorities largely tolerated 
nominally illegal behavior.378 
The Office of the Inspector General of HHS attempted to clarify 
matters with “fraud alerts,” guidance practices, and advisory opin-
ions.379  Critics were not impressed.  David Frankford concluded that 
“laws like [these] . . . are absolutely incapable of logically defining, 
much less policing against, inflated prices . . . . [T]hey fail even to 
                                                        
get a false or fraudulent claim paid, among other conduct. 31 U.S.C. §  3729(a)(1)–(2) 
(2006). HIPAA also contributed to fraud enforcement by establishing the Health Care 
Fraud and Abuse Control Program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(2)(C) (2006). 
 375.  Civil actions have a less strict scienter requirement than criminal law or the Medi-
care/Medicaid civil false claims statute.  Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (civil false claims, ex-
pressly stating “no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.”) with 18 U.S.C. § 287 
(criminal false claims); see also United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(addressing the “ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand problem” of contractors who are not 
personally aware of overcharges”).   
 376.  See Rebecca Bethard, Physician Self-Referral: Beyond Stark II, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 465, 
478–479 (2005) (promoting “the prohibition of physician referral of patients to any entity 
in which they have a financial interest for both public funds and private pay sources”); 
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse: Clarification of the Initial 
OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Un-
der the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 223 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
 377.  See, e.g., Isaac Buck, Health Care Fraud and Abuse Syllabus, Seton Hall Law 
School, Spring, 2012 (on file with author).  
 378.  See supra text accompanying note 242.  This is still a problem.  See, e.g., Jean M. 
Mitchell, The Prevalence of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements After Stark II: Evidence From Ad-
vanced Diagnostic Imaging, 26 HEALTH AFF. w415 (2007). 
 379.  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
https://oig.hhs.gov/. 
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create a language for comprehensible debate.”380  Policy analysts 
found much to be desired in the laws’ treatment of financial incen-
tives and billing practices.381 
In one of the leading health care fraud cases, United States v. 
Krizek,382 heavy-handed enforcement tactics became a cause célèbre 
for Congress.383  In the case, a small psychiatric practice was sued for 
over $80 million because of its billing and coding practices.384  The 
two clerical workers at the practice (one of whom, Mrs. Krizek, was 
the wife of the psychiatrist) would often assume that the most expen-
sive category of care was provided, without confirming details with the 
                                                        
 380.  David Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Refer-
rals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1937 (1989).  But see Arnold S. 
Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749, 750 (1985) (claiming 
that, “when physicians seek income beyond fee for service and make business arrange-
ments with other providers of services to their patients . . . [s]uch arrangements introduce 
a new and unnecessary conflict, which strains the physician’s fiduciary commitment to the 
patient”).  
 381.  Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a Modern-Day 
Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 355–56 (2010) (describing critiques of the pro-
gram). 
 382.  111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997).   
 383.  For a leading account of the case, see Thomas L. Greaney & Joan H. Krause, Unit-
ed States v. Krizek: Rough Justice Under the Civil False Claims Act, in HEALTH LAW AND 
BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 187, 199–200 (Sandra H. Johnson et al. eds., 2009).  Relat-
ing her experience to the traumas of authoritarian rule in Czechoslovakia, Mrs. Krizek tes-
tified before a sympathetic congressional committee on the “Kafkaesque” features of the 
fraud prosecution. Administrative Crimes and Quasi-Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 42 (1998), available 
at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju59925.000/hju59925_0.htm 
(“We have been fighting to establish the truth about my husband’s medical practice for 
almost 6 years.  It has been a very difficult thing to do in this era where Kafkaesque admin-
istrative rules can and do result in the criminalization of medicine.  Based on Health Care 
Financing Administration, HCFA, regulations, the Government filed an $81 million lawsuit 
under the False Claims Act against my husband and me. The suit has been our worst 
nightmare.”).   
 384.  United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 935–36.  
Liability can quickly add up because of potential penalties of several thousand dollars per 
false claim.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (stating that liability carries a civil penalty between 
$5,000 and $10,000 “plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains 
because of the act of that person”). 
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provider, Dr. Krizek.385  They would also upcode appointments by bill-
ing for all the time related to the patient, rather than direct consulta-
tion time.386 
Defendants like the Krizeks complained that they had honest 
misunderstandings of the billing codes.387  For example, while Dr. 
Krizek may not have spent fifty minutes in person with a given patient 
for whom he billed for a fifty-minute visit, he could have spent more 
than fifty minutes on follow-up phone calls and administrative re-
sponsibilities relating to the patients’ medication, insurance, and in-
stitutionalization.388  The Krizeks claimed that they had neither the 
time nor money to consult attorneys on such interpretations.389 
Since 1998, the health care fraud landscape had changed mark-
edly, in ways that would make the plight of the Krizeks far less likely in 
the future.  Fraud has continued, but enforcers have found more 
granular methods of addressing it.  Both HHS and DOJ, the agencies 
primarily responsible for combating health care fraud in the Medi-
care program, have developed sophisticated methods to assure early 
detection of potentially fraudulent activity.  Increased interagency co-
operation and enhanced technical capabilities have greatly improved 
enforcement methods.390  By intensively analyzing data, contractors 
can spot warning signs and deploy interventions less disruptive and 
stigmatizing than prosecution.391  Spectacular “busts” still occur, but 
the standard case involves more measured and calibrated interven-
tions.392  The story of growing use of health information technology in 
fraud and abuse detection and enforcement is an example of gov-
ernment leading the health sector toward becoming a full-fledged in-
formation industry, with all the implied gains in efficiency and stand-
ardization. 
                                                        
 385.  Krizek, 859 F. Supp. at 9. 
 386.  Id. 
 387.  Id. at 10. 
 388.  Id. at 9–10. 
 389.  Id. at 12–13 (“[D]efendants emphasize[d] the ‘Ma and Pa’ nature of [the prac-
tice].”). 
 390.  ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD & ABUSE § 1:4 (2012). 
 391.  See id.  
 392.  For the “bust” model, see News Release, Department of Justice Office of Public 
Affairs, Dallas Doctor Arrested for Alleged Role in Nearly $375 Million Health Care Fraud 
Scheme (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-
crm-260.html. 
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2.  Data Mining as a Fraud Enforcement Priority 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 allocated about $480 million 
in funding (over a ten-year period) to enable states to perform sophis-
ticated fraud analysis as well.393  Each state must have a Medicaid Man-
agement Information System (“MMIS”).394  The Medicaid Integrity 
Program obligates states to mirror processes established by the Medi-
care Integrity Program.395  Each state that establishes a Medicaid Man-
agement Information System by creating centralized repositories for 
data can more easily detect “fraudulent, abusive, unnecessary, or in-
appropriate utilization.”396  For example, the records may reveal “pat-
terns identified with respect to service, time, or patient that appear to 
be suspect or otherwise implausible.”397 
To permit more extensive data mining and collaboration with 
other enforcement agencies, CMS began developing the Medicaid In-
tegrity Group (“MIG”) data engine in 2008, potentially combining da-
ta from MMIS and each states’ Medicaid Statistical Information Sys-
tems.398  Both the MIG data engine and an Integrated Data Repository 
(“IDR”) are designed to support enforcement efforts.399  When com-
pleted, the IDR will include claims and payment data from various 
health care programs.400 The IDR is slated to include “state-of-the-art 
health informatics.”401  The integration of Medicare and Medicaid 
                                                        
 393.  GOSFIELD, supra note 390, at  § 1:4 (citing Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 603; 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2012)). 
 394.  Pub. L. 92-603, Sec. 235; 45 C.F.R. § 250.90 (1974), amended as 42 C.F.R. § 433(c) 
(2011).  
 395.  42 C.F.R. § 455(C) (2011). 
 396.  Kathy Giannangelo, Mining Medicare and Medicaid Data to Detect Fraud, 78 J. AM. 
HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N.  66, 68 (2007).  
 397.  GOSFIELD, supra note 390, at  § 6:13. 
 398.  CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAID INTEGRITY 
PLAN OF THE MEDICAID INTEGRITY PROGRAM 3 (2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/downloads/CMIP2009-
2013.pdf. 
 399.  Id.; Exhibit 300 (BY2010) for CMS Integrated Data Repository, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocio/capitalplanning/exhibit300/FY10Exhibit300/cmsintegrateddat
arepository.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 400.  Exhibit 300 (BY2010) for CMS Integrated Data Repository, supra note 399. 
 401.  CMS Integrated Data Repository (IDR), CMS.GOV, http://www4a.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Computer-Data-and-Systems/IDR/index.html?redirect=/IDR/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
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claims, beneficiary data, provider data, and plan data into one system 
suggests the ambition of Google or other tech giants, which have har-
nessed cross-database search capacities for a variety of innovative 
ends.402 
Critics of Medicaid have complained about the fragmented na-
ture of its administration.403  Anti-fraud programs, however, appear to 
be unifying sources of data that were once disparate.  The data miners 
are comparing findings from the Medicare program across states.404  
Just as a network of fusion centers can readily transmit troubling or 
suspicious patterns of criminal intelligence horizontally (to other 
state or local level agencies) or vertically (to national agencies), state 
Medicaid Integrity Programs both empower and are empowered by 
rapid data flows.405  The Medicare-Medicaid Data Match Program, or 
Medi-Medi project, breaks down barriers between the surveillance 
and analysis done by different entities.406 
The CMS processes billions of dollars in payments each year, at a 
fraction of the administrative cost of most private insurers.407  This is 
not, strictly speaking, a triumph of government over business.  Rather, 
CMS buys its administrative expertise the old-fashioned way: in the 
marketplace.408  By deploying a team of private sector contractors at 
the cutting edge of information industries, the agency has significant-
ly increased fraud recoveries and promoted responsible billing prac-
tices.  According to the Office of the Inspector General of HHS, CMS 
                                                        
 402.  GOSFIELD, supra note 390, at  § 6:13. 
 403.  See supra notes 312, 380. 
 404.  See supra note 312. 
 405.  Id. 
 406.  See The Medicare-Medicaid (Medi-Medi) Data Match Program, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-08-00370.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 407.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD, CMS FRAUD PREVENTION 
INITIATIVE 1 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Outreach 
/Partnerships/Downloads/BackgrounderFraudPreventionInitiative.pdf (“Health care 
fraud perpetrators steal billions of dollars each year from Federal and State govern-
ments . . . .  Through the Fraud Prevention Initiative, the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services (CMS) is working to ensure that correct payments are made to legitimate 
providers . . . .”). 
 408.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-592, MEDICARE INTEGRITY PROGRAM: 
MEDICARE INTEGRITY PROGRAM: CMS USED INCREASED FUNDING FOR NEW ACTIVITIES BUT 
COULD IMPROVE MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/322183.pdf (describing contractors’ roles and legal au-
thority). 
 2013] GRAND BARGAINS FOR BIG DATA 759 
recovered seventeen dollars for every dollar it spent on health care 
fraud enforcement in 2008.409 
As classic deterrence theory would predict, part of the response 
to the persistence of fraud has been increasing the penalties so that 
those caught would face jail time, large fines, or permanent exclusion 
from federal programs.410  But this strategy can be risky and expensive.  
Proving criminal intent in a highly technical field is daunting, as DOJ 
teams have discovered anew in the wake of an epidemic of mortgage 
malfeasance and foreclosure fraud.411 
A complementary approach is to broaden the scope of surveil-
lance to enable a series of less intense interventions designed to im-
mediately catch grotesque frauds and to educate and nudge errant, 
sloppy, or suspicious providers toward better behavior.  That has been 
the approach of the Medicare Integrity Program and follow-up pro-
jects aimed at Medicaid providers.412 
The CMS has pioneered innovative deployments of private sector 
contractors in social welfare programs.  It has used “fiscal intermedi-
aries (FIs), carriers, and durable medical equipment regional carriers 
(DMERCs) to process Part A, Part B, and durable medical equipment 
(DME) claims for reimbursement” for decades, and it has used Quali-
ty Improvement Organizations (“QIOs”) to assess the value and effec-
tiveness of care offered.413  The agency has also employed a wide array 
of contractors to detect and deter improper payments.414 
                                                        
 409.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2008 
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 2 (2008), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/ 
docs/budget/FY2008_APR.pdf.  As Krause has observed, “[t]he ratio was calculated as the 
agency’s ‘expected recoveries’ from audit disallowances, investigative returns, and admin-
istrative enforcement divided by its annual budget authority.”  Krause, supra note 381, at 
356 n.62. 
 410.  See infra notes 375, 384. 
 411.  See, e.g., John Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 
2011, at C1 (“[A]n initial burst of optimism by federal officials when they began examin-
ing [financial fraud] . . . slowly gave way to frustration over how to prove criminal intent.”). 
 412.  State Medicaid Fraud Control Units: Data Mining, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,637 (proposed 
Mar. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1007).  Divisions within OIG (such as the 
Office of Audit Services, Office of Investigations, and Office of Evaluation and Inspec-
tions) can also undertake data analysis. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 2(2)(B); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 408 (analyzing CMS use of its funding). 
 413.  Sara Kay Wheeler et al., Meet the Fraud Busters: Program Safeguard Contractors and 
Zone Program Integrity Contractors, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1 (2011) (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 
421.100 (FIs), 421.200 (carriers), 421.210 (DMERCs) and describing the functions of 
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The CMS is committed to “developing new methods and tech-
nologies to stay ahead of criminals and identify their patterns of be-
havior early” and “data analysis to identify cases of suspected fraud, 
waste and abuse.”415  The Medicare Program Integrity Manual governs 
Medicare fraud-detection contractors, along with applicable State-
ments of Work.416  According to the manual, comprehensive error rate 
testing (“CERT”) contractors “establish[] error rates and estimates of 
improper payments.”417  The Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) 
“detect and correct improper payments in the Medicare FFS [fee for 
service] program and provide information to CMS, ACs [affiliated 
contractors] and MACs [Medicare administrative contractors].”418  
                                                        
each); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
MANUAL § 1.3.6 (last updated Nov. 20, 2009) [hereinafter MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
MANUAL]; 42 C.F.R. § 421.304 (describing the function of Medicare Integrity Program 
Contractors). 
 414.  Timothy Martin, Revenue-Cycle Management and Reimbursement: The Impact of Health 
Law and Health Reform on Providers, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 159 (2011) (discussing the 
creation and authorization of contractors and the methods utilized in analyzing claims); 
see also Mark E. Reagan and Mark A. Johnson, Taming the Medicaid Beast: The Federal Gov-
ernment’s Ambitious Attempt to Combat Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 1 (2010) (explaining “the role and duties of Medicaid Integrity Contractors”). 
 415.  Anatomy of a Fraud Bust: From Investigation to Conviction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Peter Budetti, Director, Ctr. for Program In-
tegrity, Health & Human Servs.), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/04/ 
t20120424a.html. 
 416.  MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 413, § 1.1 (“Medicare admin-
istrative contractors (MACs), comprehensive error rate testing (CERT) contractors, recov-
ery audit contractors (RACs), program safeguard contractor (PSCs) and zone program 
integrity contractors (ZPICs) shall follow the PIM [Program Integrity Manual] as required 
by their applicable Statement of Work (SOW).”). 
 417.  Id. § 1.3.1. (“Error rates produced by the CERT program” are used to “identify 
where to target [] improper payment prevention efforts.”).  A Fraud Prevention System 
(FPS) runs “predictive algorithms and other sophisticated analytics nationwide against all 
Medicare fee-for-service claims . . . prior to payment.”  Assessing Medicare and Medicaid Pro-
gram Integrity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Org., Efficiency, & Fin. Mgmt. of the H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Peter Budetti, Direc-
tor, Center for Program Integrity, Health & Human Services), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/06/t20120607a.html. 
 418.  MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 413, § 1.3.1(C).  It is difficult 
to prevent all improper payments, considering that more than 1 billion claims are pro-
cessed each year.  Id.  To address this issue, CMS uses specialized programs to detect and 
 2013] GRAND BARGAINS FOR BIG DATA 761 
Once these surveillance entities produce data, Medicare Administra-
tive Contractors [“MACs”] can identify program vulnerabilities and 
develop approaches to respond to wayward providers.419  Their medi-
cal reviews do not have to culminate in charges or prosecutions; ra-
ther, “prepayment edits” and provider education are preferred in 
many situations.420  In severe cases, MACs can refer problem providers 
to Program Safeguard Contractors (“PSCs”) and Zone Program Integ-
rity Contractors (“ZPICs”), which conduct data analysis focused on 
potentially fraudulent activity, as well as “benefit integrity investiga-
tions.”421 
ZPICs are emerging as sophisticated analysts of data.  They en-
gage not only in reactive but proactive efforts to identify fraud, comb-
ing records for outliers.  They can access a wide array of information 
sources.422  Conditions of participation for providers in CMS programs 
may enable further surveillance.423 
                                                        
correct improper payments and “provide information to CMS, ACs and MACs that could 
help protect the Medicare Trust Funds by preventing future improper payments.”  Id.  
 419.  Id. at § 1.3.1.B (Medicare contractors “primarily use error rates produced by the 
CERT program and vulnerabilities identified through the RAC program to identify where 
to target their improper payment prevention efforts.”). 
 420.  Medical Appeals Council reviews are designed to spot errors.  The Medicare Pro-
gram Integrity Manual advises contractors that “most errors do not represent fraud.  Most 
errors are not acts that were committed knowingly, willfully, and intentionally.”  Id. § 1.3.9. 
 421.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd (PSCs); 42 U.S.C. 1395kk (ZPICs); see also Wheeler et al., su-
pra note 413, at 14 (“ZPICs have been charged with tasks similar to those assigned to PSCs, 
but covering larger geographic areas and additional claim categories, including Medicare 
Parts A, B, C, and D; durable medical equipment; home health and hospice; and the Med-
icare Medicaid Data Match Project.”). 
 422.  Wheeler et al., supra note 413, at 23.  ZPICs can access referrals from MACs, QIOs, 
states’ Medicaid fraud control units, state licensing boards, and U.S. Attorney offices; OIG 
reports; beneficiary complaints; fraud alerts; national claims data from the Health Care 
Customer Information System; National Claims Data from the CMS Data Center’s Part B 
Analytics.  Id.  Complaints can be fielded from virtually any person with “direct and inde-
pendent information of the fraud,” including compliance officers, employees (both cur-
rent and former), technologists, auditors, accountants, consultants, and salespersons.  Id. 
 423.  42 C.F.R. § 405.370; 42 C.F.R. § 455.2 (authorizes government use of claims data 
mining to detect alleged fraud in Medicare and Medicaid, respectively); 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ddd (authorizes HHS to enter into contracts with eligible entities to conduct fraud 
detecting activities); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976); Christopher Slobo-
gin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 330 (2008). 
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Sampling methods are likely to improve and become less contro-
versial as data capture and the science of data analysis advance.424  An-
ti-fraud contractors engage in intense and fine-grained surveillance.  
Just as David Ticoll & Don Tapscott predicted in 2003 that “radical 
transparency” would shake up the business world,425 CMS’s myriad 
contractors are motivating health care providers to modernize their 
practices.426  Moreover, because the Medicare Program Integrity Man-
ual does not define how sustained or how high a provider’s error rate 
must be for a PSC or ZPIC to engage in statistical sampling and ex-
trapolation,” there is pressure for continuous quality improvement.427 
If the consequences of errant billing were as generally grievous as 
they were for the Krizeks, this mode of panoptic enforcement would 
be deeply troubling.  The range of remedies available to MACs and 
ZPICs, however, lowers the stakes of surveillance.  For example, Medi-
care Administrative Contractors can engage in prepayment review 
that keeps an overpayment (and thus a particular episode of fraud) 
from ever reaching a provider.428  In the Krizeks’ case, a computer sys-
tem could have recognized and rejected the claims filed on days when 
Dr. Krizek was alleged to have worked more than twenty-four hours.  
                                                        
 424.  MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 413, § 2.2, 2.4.  Medicare 
Claims Flow indicates that providers information goes to claims payers (twenty-two CMS 
MAC contractors), then to Claims Processing Systems.  ZPICs may eventually coordinate 
efforts with domestic intelligence agencies known as fusion centers, which freely mine data 
from citizens’ financial records, data brokers’ digital dossiers, and cell phones.  Cf. Citron 
& Pasquale, supra note 312, at 1449 (describing deployment of California fusion center 
resources to combat insurance fraud).   
 425.  DAVID TICOLL & DON TAPSCOTT, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF 
TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS 5 (2003) (describing openness as a busi-
ness imperative).  
 426.  The Recovery Audit Contractor Program was created by the Medicare Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003 to recover Medicare overpayments under Fee-For-Service Medicare Plans.  
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 made the program permanent, and required 
implementation in all states by 2010.  During the demonstration program that ran from 
2005 to 2008, the RAC program had identified approximately $992.7 million of improper 
overpayments for CMS.  As the authority, functions, and objectives of contractors differ, 
providers are advised to “develop unique plans for communicating and interacting with 
each contractor to minimize the risk of sanctions for alleged noncompliance.”  Wheeler et 
al., supra note 413, at 7. 
 427.  Wheeler et al., supra note 413, at 20. 
 428.  MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 413, § 3.3.4. 
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Intervention would have come much sooner and been less disruptive 
to all parties involved. 
The level of surveillance engaged in by CMS’s contractors may be 
disturbing to some observers.  Nonetheless, authorities in the area are 
trying to match the technological advantages accrued by providers as 
they utilize powerful new programs to optimize billing opportuni-
ties.429  For example, physicians can simply “copy and paste” an exam-
ination performed on a complex case to a record for a less complex 
case, or “clone” records.430 Dr. Donald Simborg has worried that, 
“[w]ithout proactive fraud management functions built in, fraud will 
increase in an electronic environment.”431  Simborg goes so far as to 
recommend a process of fraud detection built into EHRs themselves, 
reminiscent of FTC’s push for “privacy by design” to be included in 
hardware and software used by consumers.432  Though the enforce-
ment tactics of CMS, OIG, and DOJ have not yet included fraud de-
tection “baked in” to software, the past decade’s developments in the 
digitization of CMS’s program integrity tactics need to be situated in a 
broader political economy of law enforcement.  Administrators must 
weigh the benefits of accuracy against the costs of observation, moni-
toring, and the panoply of rights and investigations necessarily grant-
ed in a given proceeding.  Cheaper monitoring generally reduces the 
                                                        
 429.  Fred Schulte, Billing Software Helps Medical Professionals Document Higher Fees, CTR. 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/19/10812/ 
growth-electronic-medical-records-eases-path-inflated-bills (“Medicare regulators . . . 
acknowledge they are struggling to rein in a surge of aggressive—and potentially expen-
sive—billing by doctors and hospitals that they have linked, at least anecdotally, to the rap-
id proliferation of the billing software and electronic medical records.  A variety of federal 
reports and whistleblower suits reflect these concerns.”); Reed Abelson, Medicare Bills Rise 
as Records Turn Electronic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at A1; Jeffrey Helton, Avoiding Fraud 
Risks Associated with EHRs, HEALTH FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (2010), available at 
http://www.mfrpc.com/Default.aspx?DN=f927c939-4f17-44ae-870d-dcbaa978d59c. 
 430.  Daniel Essin, The Ethical Dilemma Created by EHRs, PHYSICIANS PRACTICE, June 18, 
2012, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/content/article/1462168/ 
2083374; Robert E. Hirschtick, Copy-and-Paste, 295 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2335 (2006) (“By the 
power of repetition, everything in EMR becomes true.”). 
 431.  Donald Simborg, There Is No Neutral Position on Fraud, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS 
ASS’N (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3168321/. 
 432.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE v (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf 
(“Companies should adopt a ‘privacy by design’ approach by building privacy protections 
into their everyday business practices.”). 
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costs of enforcement.  It diminishes the attractiveness of severe prose-
cutions, focusing instead on a series of calibrated interventions.433 
This is, perhaps, yet another example of the evolution of pro-
cesses of punishment that Foucault observed: from well-publicized 
and dramatic imprisonments of wrongdoers to a softer yet more per-
vasive power.  Legal scholars are mainly familiar with Foucault as a 
cutting critic of this evolution, someone who reminds us of the con-
straining and enervating aspects of disciplinary procedures that suc-
ceed insofar as they embed themselves seamlessly into technology, ar-
chitecture, and social assumptions.434  Yet there are more or less 
appropriate places for surveillance, and if there is any realm where 
the biopolitics of persistent monitoring is appropriate, it may well be 
that of health care.435  As the 1999 Institute of Medicine report436 re-
minds us, tens of thousands of individuals die each year due to pre-
ventable medical error.437  To the extent that data mining helps us 
                                                        
 433. . For example, Medicaid Integrity Contractors (MICs) do not just punish fraud; 
they can also engage in education to assure that providers know how the law applies to 
them.  Mark E. Reagan and Mark A. Johnson, Taming the Medicaid Beast: The Federal Gov-
ernment’s Ambitious Attempt to Combat Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 13 (2010) (“Based on the information learned by the Review and Audit MICs, Edu-
cation MICs educate healthcare providers, state Medicaid officials, and others about a va-
riety of Medicaid program integrity issues via web-based and traditional methods.  As op-
posed to Review and Audit MICs, Education MICs are not necessarily assigned geographic 
responsibilities.”). 
 434.  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–
217 (1977) (surveying evolving modes of social control, from “spectacularly” cruel and 
painful violence to more subtle modes of monitoring, reward, and deterrence). 
 435.  Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate 
Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 328 (2004) (examining the 
“consequences flowing from the imposition of increasingly significant governmentally di-
rected and enforced surveillance . . . on private actors within the economic sphere”). 
 436.  INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 1 (1999), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/ 
media/Files/Report%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201 
999%20%20report%20brief.pdf. 
 437.  See generally PETER PRONOVOST & ERIC VOHR, SAFE PATIENTS, SMART HOSPITALS: 
HOW ONE DOCTOR’S CHECKLIST CAN HELP US CHANGE HEALTH CARE FROM THE INSIDE 
OUT (2010); ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 
(2009); Michael Millenson, How Many More Dead Patients?, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Mar. 10, 
2012), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2012/03/10/how-many-more-dead-patients/ 
(reviewing estimates). 
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identify obviously problematic patterns of treatment, it can reduce 
morbidity and mortality. 
A bipartisan consensus focusing resources on the fraud and 
abuse problem reflects larger social trends.  As Bernard Harcourt and 
Loïc Wacquant have shown, neoliberal penality has been a hallmark 
of U.S. politics since the 1970s.438  Overly aggressive fraud and abuse 
enforcement can achieve both of the aims of neoliberal penality: a 
reduction in state support for social welfare spending and the re-
allocation of governmental energies to “guard labor.”439  Yet a creative 
repurposing of the tools of contractors could redirect surveillance 
from a primarily punitive role to a more constructive one. 
Larry Cata Backer has developed a general theory of the role of 
surveillance in corporate settings.  As he has argued, surveillance 
“serves as a means, made possible by increasingly effective technolo-
gies of recording and preservation, to allow the replaying of the past 
in the future.”440  Moreover, monitoring and assessment critically in-
volve “assertions of power over what can be 
seen/recorded/reduced.”441  The mere threat of intense assessment of 
interventions can increase productivity.442  Work can be performed 
more efficiently as it is recorded and studied.443  New forms of “high-
speed science” and regulation depend on rapid accumulation of da-
ta.444 
                                                        
 438.  BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE 
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 196 (2011) (explaining that “archeology of regulation” shows 
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the criminal justice wing of the American state”).   
 439.  Arjun Jayadev and Samuel Bowles, Guard Labor, 79 J. DEV. ECON. 328, 331 (2006). 
 440.  Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects of 
Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 110 (2008).  
 441.  Id. at 111. 
 442.  Id. at 112. 
 443.  Id. 
 444.  Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital 
Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 670 (2012).   
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To be sure, data mining will not be a panacea.445  There is still 
much work to be done to “prevent fraud from occurring, as well as 
detect fraud both prospectively and retrospectively.”446  Senator 
Charles Grassley has alleged that CMS’s modes of funding the con-
tractors are opaque, and that CMS may have ulterior motives that dis-
tract or deter it from aggressive enforcement of law.447  Certain con-
tractors may not be pulling their weight; for example, “in June 2012, 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported that over a 
five year period, the MIC contractors cost $102 million and returned 
less than $20 million, resulting in an overall loss to the federal gov-
ernment of $82 million.”448  While doctors believe that the contractors 
have also been too harsh and arbitrary in their treatment of health 
                                                        
 445.  For example, those committing fraud can change behavior in response to the in-
creased possibility of getting caught. Clifton Phua, A Comprehensive Survey of Data-Mining 
Fraud Detection Research, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REV. (2005), available at 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1009/1009.6119.pdf. 
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nical changes in electronic health records; many have not yet been implemented). 
 447.  Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to CMS Administrator Donald Berwick, M.D. 
(Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/ 
?id=75ab598e-fc6d-4eb2-9277-de216f13afc6 (“[T]he potential financial conflicts of interest 
created by the organizational relationships between certain CMS contractors raise ques-
tions about whether or not some ZPICS and PSCs can effectively carry out their contractu-
al responsibilities . . . .”); Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to CMS Administrator Donald 
Berwick, M.D. (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/2010-
10-15-Letter-to-CMS.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
WORK PLAN FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/ 
workplan/2011/FY11_WorkPlan-All.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE’S PROGRAM SAFEGUARD CONTRACTORS: PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION REPORTS (2006), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-04-
00050.pdf. 
 448.  AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER VALUE AND EFFICIENCY 3, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/washington/medicare-medicaid-program-integrity.pdf (online 
pamphlet) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-627, NATIONAL MEDICAID 
AUDIT PROGRAM: CMS SHOULD IMPROVE REPORTING AND FOCUS ON AUDIT 
COLLABORATION WITH STATES (2012)). 
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professionals,449 other critics want more referrals to DOJ to pursue 
criminal charges.450  As of 2010, the American Health Information 
Management Association (“AHIMA”) estimated that only three to ten 
percent of health care fraud is being caught.451  Even more disturbing-
ly, there are some allegations that automation is giving rise not only to 
new forms of abuse detection but also to new forms of abuse.452  Bad 
data may also reduce the possibility of detection.453 
Despite such problems, it is important to recognize the successes 
of contractors in utilizing sophisticated data mining to fight fraud.454  
While HHS and DOJ recovered $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2009,455 they 
                                                        
 449.  Dani Grigg, Medical Suppliers in Idaho and Nationwide Scramble to Keep Up With Surg-
ing Medicare Audits, IDAHO BUS. REV., June 29, 2012. 
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suppliers to support DOJ and HHS-OIG enforcement efforts). 
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foundation.org/downloads/pdfs/Fraud%20and%20Abuse%20-%20final%2011-4-10.pdf. 
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29, 2012, at A1 (“Medicare, which is charged with managing the incentive program that 
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electronic records systems is accurate.”); Rebekah A.Z. Monson & Elizabeth M. Hein, Two 
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Security Enforcement, 24 HEALTH LAWYER 34 (2011). 
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Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Ann Maxwell, Regional 
Inspector Gen., Health & Human Services), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/ 
docs/2012/Maxwell_testimony_06072012%20.pdf (“OIG has found that . . . MSIS data 
[utilized by MICs] are not current, available, complete, and accurate.”). 
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Care Fraud, STAR TRIB., Feb. 11, 2013, available at http://www.startribune.com/nation/ 
190690901.html (“The $7.90 average return on investment is the highest in the 16-year 
history of the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program.  Since 1997, the program—a joint 
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 455.  Pete Yost, Medicare Fraud Enforcement Efforts Recovered $2.5 Billion In 2009, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2010, 06:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/ 
13/medicare-fraud-enforcement_n_574553.html. 
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recovered more than $4 billion in fiscal year 2010.456  The high-tech 
Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team 
(“HEAT”) established by the agencies has also enhanced monitoring 
capacity.457  HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced that her de-
partment was analyzing “claims in real time to flag potential scams . . . 
[doing] what credit card companies have been doing for decades.”458  
HHS is finally embracing the analytics and search capacity of infor-
mation industries. 
A leading commentator on fraud and abuse enforcement, Joan 
H. Krause, has praised the HEAT initiative for utilizing “state-of-the-
art technology to analyze electronic claims data for patterns that 
might indicate fraud, in as close to real-time as possible—a practice 
the health care reform legislation seeks to expand.”459  She has ob-
served that it is “taking advantage of advances in claims-review tech-
nology” to “prevent fraud before questionable claims are paid, rather 
than chasing down the perpetrators (and funds) after the fact.”460  
This technologically enabled enforcement produced immediate re-
sults: within months of being announced, it led to several crack-
downs.461 
                                                        
 456.  News Release, Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., Health Care Fraud Prevention and 
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Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 473 (2008) (“Most 
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 459.  Krause, supra note 381, at 368. 
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It is easy to get lost in the “alphabet soup” of agencies, contrac-
tors, and task forces now addressing health care fraud.  Their various 
methods, however, usually track the modes of search, personalization, 
and analytics discussed earlier in this Article.462  They are detecting 
more misuses of CMS funds.  It is now time to turn the significant 
power and influence of these analytics networks to the twin conun-
drums of cost containment and quality improvement in medicine. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the film Sleep Dealer, a laborer encounters a woman who oper-
ates a “memory recorder.”463  This computerized transcription ma-
chine translates past experiences into video re-enactments.464  The 
machine occasionally sputters as the laborer narrates his story, and its 
operator chides him to “be more truthful”—to hew closer to the actu-
al facts.465  The film is ambiguous as to whether the machine, its oper-
ator, or the laborer really knows what actually happened in any given 
scenario.466  The video transcriber kindles and mocks the laborer’s de-
sire for an authoritative representation of the past.467 
For too long, health data systems have been like Sleep Dealer’s 
memory machine, provoking a messy struggle to determine the true 
value of various treatments.  Digitized and networked health IT could 
streamline the process, bringing some of the productivity gains of in-
                                                        
vestigation to Conviction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th Cong. (2012) (state-
ment of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., Health & Human Services), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OIG%20Written%20Test%20SFC%20A
natomy%20FINAL.PDF (announcing the indictment of ninety-one defendants for Medi-
care fraud schemes); News Release, U.S. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., Health Care 
Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Recover Record $4 Billion; New Affordable 
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 462.  See supra Parts III.D, IV. 
 463.  SLEEP DEALER (Maya Entertainment, 2008). 
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formation industries to medicine.468  But it can only do so if policy-
makers can broker a “grand bargain” between providers, patients, and 
funders: more access to data for researchers, in exchange for dedicat-
ed systems designed to protect the integrity of intellectual property 
and the security of personally identifiable information. 
Naysayers doubt CMS’s institutional capacity to accomplish such 
reforms.  But the agency’s successful deployment of private sector 
contractors in the context of fraud and abuse enforcement turns the 
tables on these anti-government critics.469  Given their own enthusiasm 
for contracting out government work, they can scarcely allege that the 
agency is inherently incapable of finding businesses to perform so-
phisticated data collection and analysis.  Public-private surveillance 
partnerships already subject providers’ bills to rigorous audits;470 
health privacy law will soon require audit-capability for digital medical 
records.471  The key question now is whether we will limit these capaci-
ties to a law enforcement context or broaden them to affirmatively 
improve public health and reduce costs. 
The laws governing the management of health care information 
are extremely complex.  Some of this complexity is necessary to the 
subject matter.  Yet, it should not obscure the larger goals of health 
information law.  Surveillance of health data has many ends, some 
public-spirited and others narrowly commercial.  Law should incentiv-
ize productive surveillance, while being far more cognizant of stake-
holders’ rights to block data flows (and annotate or challenge result-
ing analyses) when such forms of surveillance merely evince an 
exercise of power, serving only as an effort to redistribute benefits and 
burdens rather than (respectively) increasing or decreasing them.472 
The divide between surveillance as an exercise of power and sur-
veillance for public goals can sometimes be blurry.473  This does not 
mean, however, that it is futile to develop an industrial policy for the 
acquisition and use of health information.  Rather, we need to pro-
mote the types of analysis that are most likely to reduce the disease 
burden and promote wellness.474  Once citizens are confident that the 
health information infrastructure is primarily devoted to promoting 
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their health, rather than sorting or stigmatizing them, we should wit-
ness the kind of broad-scale buy-in that is a sine qua non for a popula-
tion actively engaged in maintaining its health.475 
Government alone cannot accomplish this process.476  It will de-
pend on a constellation of private contractors to react to the new 
health care landscape with the flexibility and nimbleness that public 
bureaucracies tend to lack.477  Even so, we should not expect great re-
sults from the private sector alone.  Government will need to catalyze 
comprehensive, interoperable, and auditable data collection sys-
tems.478  Public-private surveillance partnerships can help providers 
fully realize the value of new health information technology.479  If they 
succeed, public health imperatives will often trump standard rights to 
control data, creating a health information law distinct from tradi-
tional doctrines of intellectual property and privacy law.480 
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APPENDIX: GUIDE TO ACRONYMS 
ACs: Affiliated Contractors 
ACA: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations 
ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
ATCBs: Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies 
CER: Common Exchange Representation 
CERT: Comprehensive Error Rate Testing 
CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security 
DME: Durable Medical Equipment 
DMERCs: Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carriers 
DOJ: Department of Justice 
EHR or EMR: Electronic Health/Medical Records 
FDA: Food and Drug Administration 
GPO: Group Purchasing Organizations  
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services 
HIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HIT: Health Information Technology 
HITECH: Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act 
MACs: Medicare Administrative Contractors 
OIG: Office of the Inspector General 
ONC: Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology 
PCAST: President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
nology 
PHRs: Personal Health Records 
PPACA: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
PSCs: Program Safeguard Contractors 
QIOs: Quality Improvement Organizations 
ZPICs: Zone Program Integrity Contractors 
